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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the influence of personal bias in the political 
leaders in the U.S.-German dispute in 2002-2003 over the Iraq campaign and the 
nature of the Atlantic Alliance in the 21st century in the face of a new international 
security environment.  
The focus is on the life experiences and the crucial influence of the two 
national-level decision-makers, President George W. Bush and Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder. The thesis examines the course of events and the shifts in 
foreign policy after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, in the two 
countries, in order to analyze the origins of the dispute. The study finds that the 
personalities and personal biases of the two protagonists at times outweighed 
and at times reflected political, strategic, and cultural factors during the 
escalation of the dispute between the traditionally close transatlantic allies. 
Examples of relationships between German and U.S. national leaders from the 
1970s to the 1990s show that personality had always been a decisive factor in 
the bi-lateral relationship, but that statecraft and diplomacy prevented the 
escalation of policy disagreements and avoided the immoderate personalization 
of politics.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The shadow of the impending Iraq campaign in September 2002 caused 
the traditionally close relationship between the United States and Germany to 
lurch into a crisis of discord and misunderstanding. The German Chancellor, 
Gerhard Schröder, in the final phase of his re-election campaign, in which the 
opinions of East German voters opposed to the prospective U.S.-led intervention 
loomed large, announced the refusal of any German participation in the 
prospective war in Iraq. Furthermore, he warned the United States not to wage a 
war against the regime in Baghdad. In response, U.S. President George W. Bush 
alleged that Germany was breaking the strong and peaceful NATO alliance that 
had overcome the threats of the Cold War. In the aftermath of this political 
argument, public statements by both protagonists led to a further decline in the 
bilateral relationship that had heretofore been an unshakable front in the Atlantic 
Alliance.  
A.  PURPOSE 
This thesis investigates the influence of personal bias in the political 
leaders in the U.S.-German dispute in 2002-2003 over the Iraq campaign and the 
nature of the Atlantic Alliance in the 21st century in the face of a new international 
system of states. Since bias “is a predisposition to address an issue or react to 
others in a certain way,”1 it is necessary to investigate the experiences and 
influences that shaped the characters of George W. Bush and Gerhard Schröder. 
Therefore, this thesis reviews the principal experiences of these political leaders, 
with particular attention to events and views regarding the U.S.-German 
relationship. The result of this analysis will be compared to the relationships 
between some of the predecessors of both heads of government during the Cold 
War and its immediate aftermath. Tensions within the post-1945 U.S.- Federal 
                                            
1 MSN Encarta, http://encarta.msn.com (accessed December 12, 2007). 
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German relationship unquestionably occurred before, but had never led to a 
situation comparable to the 2002-2003 discord. Traditionally, the transatlantic 
relationship between Germany and the United States has influenced NATO 
directly and has constituted a source of stability and continuity over the decades. 
This thesis examines the question: To what extent did the personal view of the 
transatlantic relationship held by Bush and Schröder contribute to the severe 
dispute in 2002-2003? How can an analysis of this question be integrated into 
the existing knowledge of the Atlantic Alliance, NATO, U.S.-German relations 
and the record of diplomacy and statecraft?  
B.  IMPORTANCE 
How nations deal with each other, as well as relationships among heads 
of government, have a crucial influence on the world’s potential for conflict. In a 
peaceful political environment, the risk of war is much smaller than in situations 
of tension. Besides the two absolute stages of war and peace, there are 
numerous bi- and multilateral interactions that shape the international security 
environment. 
This thesis explores the crucial influence of national-level decision-makers 
on international relations, in a case study of exceptional force and enduring 
relevance, for students of theory as well as for those engaged in statecraft. A 
better grasp of individual factors may provide a basis for political leaders to 
prevent discord or at least understand unexpected reactions. The analysis is 
offered by a contemporary observer of these events and a member of the 
German armed forces engaged in advanced study in an American graduate 
school. Now that five years have passed since this episode in the German-
American relationship, the present study offers some tentative explanations for 
the uproar between Washington and Berlin in the first years of the new century.  
 3 
C.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
It is common practice to investigate issues in international relations from 
different perspectives or on different levels. The theoretical analysis of Kenneth 
N. Waltz has, for decades, been the best known level-categorization. According 
to Waltz, there are three levels (or images) of theoretical analysis regarding the 
causes of war and other political events.2 The first level is focused on the nature 
and behavior of man, and hence can be named the individual level. The second 
level focuses on the sovereign state itself, rather than on the individuals within 
this state. The third level of analysis takes the state system into consideration.  
1.  The Level of Analysis 
Several scholars have discussed the pros and cons of a systemic (third 
level) or a sub-systemic level of analysis. For example, J. David Singer has 
written, “The systemic level produces a more comprehensive and total picture of 
international relations than does the national or sub-systemic level. On the other 
hand, the atomized and less coherent image produced by the lower level of 
analysis is somewhat balanced by its richer detail, greater depth, and more 
intensive portrayal.”3 
Since the period under investigation in this thesis is relatively short, and 
additionally focused on the discord caused by the Iraq War, this thesis 
concentrates on the individual level. As Singer noted, “As to explanation, there 
seems little doubt that the sub-systemic or actor orientation is considerably more 
fruitful, permitting as it does a more thorough investigation of the processes by 
which foreign policies are made.”4 In this thesis, the focus is on two key 
individuals, George W. Bush and Gerhard Schröder. In Robert Isaak’s words, the 
                                            
2 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1959). 
3 J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," World Politics 
14, no. 1, The International System: Theoretical Essays (October, 1961), 98. 
4 Ibid., 89-90. 
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thesis is based on “the assumption that the study of international politics is 
meaningless unless one begins by analyzing individuals.”5 
Given the decision to pursue the individual level of analysis, it is 
necessary to ask about the factors that may have influenced the decision-
makers. This question is answered on at least two levels: the decision-makers’ 
personal experience, as well as the political environment that affected the 
process of decision making and its subsequent practical implementation. As 
Stephen Walt has observed, “once the policy design is complete, the time-
consuming work of overcoming bureaucratic resistance, legal constraints, 
fatigue, and partisan opposition still remains.”6  
2.  Literature on the Iraq Crisis 
The quarrel over the Iraq War in 2003 has already been investigated from 
different perspectives. In this section, the following main approaches to analyzing 
the Iraq War discord between the United States and Germany are outlined: 
contrary inter-textual relations; tactical maneuvers by the German Chancellor to 
succeed in his re-election campaign; political, strategic, and cultural differences 
between the transatlantic partners; and the demonstration of a new 
assertiveness by a united Germany.  
a.  Explanations on the Individual Level 
In a first level analysis, Erik Ringmar used the narrative type 
approach (romance, tragedy, comedy, and satire) and concluded that “the 
disagreements … have their origin in the incommensurability of narrative types.”7 
According to Ringmar’s study, George W. Bush was a romantic embarking on an 
                                            
5 Robert A. Isaak, "The Individual in International Politics: Solving the Level-of-Analysis 
Problem," Polity 7, no. 2 (Winter, 1974), 264. 
6 Stephen M. Walt, "The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations," 
Annual Review of Political Science, no. 8, (2005), 38. 
7 Erik Ringmar, "Inter-Textual Relations: The Quarrel Over the Iraq War as a Conflict 
between Narrative Types," Cooperation and Conflict 41, no. 4 (December, 2006), 404. 
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inevitable mission to spread freedom as the “chosen one” against the evil 
dictator, Saddam Hussein. As one of the representatives of the “old Europeans,” 
Gerhard Schröder enacted a comic narrative following reform-minded policies 
and favoring decisions via the gradual spread of institutions, notably the 
European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN). From this perspective, the 
clash of narratives was not surprising, but wholly predictable. 
The re-election campaign of Gerhard Schröder in 2002 is also a 
common explanation for the refusal of any German participation in the Iraq War. 
Two months prior to the election, the incumbent chancellor was 8 to 10 percent 
behind his contender. In the course of a natural disaster (the extraordinary floods 
in Brandenburg, Sachsen-Anhalt and Sachsen), he reduced this gap down to 4 
percent and acquired a new impulse for the last phase of the campaign. At the 
same time, the Bush Administration announced that it was ready for a unilateral 
preemptive military attack against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. According 
to polls, the vast majority of Germans was strictly against the war. In the last 
phase of the election campaign, the prospective Iraq War became a major issue 
in German domestic politics. According to Martin Walker, “There was a clear 
element of political calculation in Schröder’s increasingly critical remarks of the 
Bush administration’s policies, spurred by his political advisors who argued that 
he could win votes from eastern Germany.”8  
b.  Political, Strategic, and Cultural Aspects 
Other observers have used second level analyses to explain the 
origins of the U.S.-German discord. Some have focused, for example, on 
national differences, in the respective political and strategic cultures, regarding 
the use of force. On one hand, the United States has a long history of more or 
less successful use of military force and the resolution of conflicts. This 
generalization applies to the period prior to the Cold War as well as to the bipolar 
                                            
8 Martin Walker, "The Winter of Germany's Discontent," World Policy Journal 19, no. 4 
(Winter, 2002), 38. 
 6 
era, and it continues to the present day. On the other hand, Germany, one of the 
instigators of both world wars, has subsequently rejected the use of force on a 
unilateral basis, or on the basis of power politics with echoes from the 19th 
century. For the Federal Republic of Germany, from its entry into NATO in 1955 
to the early 1990s, the only exception was a possible allied defense against an 
external threat. One could argue that the Federal Republic of Germany had 
become pacifistic, and therefore, opposed any participation in a second Gulf 
War. The engagements of the German military in the former Yugoslavia in the 
1990s, and Afghanistan since late 2001 refute this argument. However, there is a 
domestic cleavage between two major camps regarding the use of force that 
continues to shape German strategic culture:9 the left has generally followed a 
pacifist interpretation of the post-World War II era (“never again war”), while the 
right-of-center has instead interpreted the role of the German military in a 
multilateral way (“never again alone”). The nascent U.S. pre-emptive approach of 
waging wars, after 11 September 2001, challenged both political camps. As Anja 
Dalgaard-Nielsen has observed, “Pre-emptive strikes against potential future 
threats carried out by coalitions of the willing did not sit well with either school of 
thought within Germany’s security culture.”10  
The German “no” to the Iraq War that burdened the U.S.-German 
relationship can also be explained by a deep-rooted anti-Americanism in Europe 
in general, and in Germany in particular. Some analysts hold that many 
Europeans, especially the left and far right elites in Western Europe, tend to 
define a European identity in opposition to America.11 The German government 
in 2002 and 2003 consisted of a left-of-center coalition. As a consequence, one 
might argue that the opposition to the Iraq War was a sort of open declaration of 
this fundamental ideological and political tension. 
                                            
9 Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-Emptive 
Strikes," Security Dialogue 36, no. 3 (September, 2005), 344. 
10 Ibid., 351. 
11 Andrei S. Markovits, Uncouth Nation: Why Europe Dislikes America (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007). 
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Another reason for the quarrel between the United States and 
Germany is the fact that Germany, the government, and its population, after the 
reunification in 1990, had become an emancipated state after the semi-
sovereignty of the era 1945-1991, with a higher level of assertiveness about its 
role in international politics. From this perspective, Germany was simply not 
convinced that a war was the appropriate way to deal with the problems in Iraq 
and the Middle East and questioned whether such a policy was consistent with 
international law. According to Tuomas Forsberg, the decision to refrain from war 
was “eased by the deep public mistrust of U.S. foreign policy within the country, 
but it reflected more a dislike of the Bush administration and was directed 
towards a particular aspect of its policies rather than being a wholesale rejection 
of a partnership with the United States.”12 Germany, by that time, was not willing 
to be only a part of the West, but granted its new weight in a united Europe, 
sought to shape the West. Forsberg argues, furthermore, that the real question in 
the U.S.-German relationship was “the nature of the world order and the USA’s 
relation to its allies, no longer the single issue of Iraq.”13 
3.  Current Scholarly Approaches: Pros and Cons 
The above explanations of Germany’s refusal to participate in the Iraq war 
in 2003 are all, to a certain extent, valid. The United States and Germany had 
different political and strategic evaluations of the necessity of a military 
engagement in Iraq. These political differences on such a crucial issue posed a 
severe challenge for both transatlantic partners. However, some of the 
explanations of the origins of the discord in 2002-2003 are unpersuasive 
because Germany, under Schröder in some cases, (e.g., Kosovo) cooperated 
with the United States regarding the use of force, while in the case of the Iraq 
War it did not.  This fact belies the belief, for instance, among U.S. neo-
                                            
12 Tuomas Forsberg, "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, 
Pacifism Or Emancipation?" Security Dialogue 36, no. 2 (June, 2005), 214. 
13 Ibid., 226. 
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conservatives that Germans are pie-eyed pacifists in the caricature that has 
operated with such force on this side of the Atlantic.  
Anti-Americanism, as a feature of the political culture in Germany, might 
have played a role, but it does not explain why after 9/11, Germany expressed 
“unconditional solidarity” with the United States and additionally supported the 
war against terrorism in Afghanistan and even granted overflight rights in 2001. 
Furthermore, as indicated above, the German opposition was focused on the 
Bush Administration, rather than on the American nation.  
The argument of a cultural clash, in terms of a left-right cleavage 
regarding the use of military force within the German elites is valid, but it does 
not explain why Chancellor Schröder used all his political power (in a vote of 
confidence) to break the pacifistic resistance in his governing coalition in the 
case of the former Yugoslavia, and yet did not do so in the Iraq war. 
It is paramount to raise the question why Germany did not participate in 
the Iraq War and, further, why the United States shifted its strategy toward pre-
emptive military engagements, since the Iraq War was the trigger of the discord. 
Moreover, the question should be answered, why did both political leaders keep 
opposing each other? For instance, after saying “no” to the Iraq War, Germany 
did not return to business as usual, but spent its efforts on building a coalition 
against the war with the aid of France and Russia. The American political 
leaders, on the other hand, unlike most of their regular diplomatic corps, started 
to divide Europe rhetorically into “old” and “new” parts and avoided any personal 
contact with the German government. "Germany has been a problem, and 
France has been a problem … But you look at vast numbers of other countries in 
Europe. They're not with France and Germany on this, they're with the United 
States. Germany and France represent ‘old Europe,’ and NATO's expansion in 
recent years means ‘the center of gravity is shifting to the east,’"14 Rumsfeld said  
 
                                            
14 “Rumsfeld: France, Germany are 'problems' in Iraqi conflict,” CNN.COM, 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/01/22/sprj.irq.wrap (accessed November 27, 2007). 
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in a statement of extraordinary power and of dubious merit. The behavior of both 
George W. Bush and Gerhard Schröder cannot be explained adequately by the 
analytical approaches reviewed above.  
The only one of these approaches that might explain the contrary notions 
of the Iraq war and the subsequent diplomatic crisis is the proposed 
categorization of narrative types on the individual level. Yet, the basis for the 
categorization, set forth by Erik Ringmar, is not detailed and seems rather 
arbitrary.   
D.  METHODOLOGY 
In view of the limitations and weaknesses of the predominant current 
explanations, a detailed analysis of the operational codes of the two protagonists, 
George W. Bush and Gerhard Schröder, might fill these gaps. Here the analysis 
pays a debt to the late Alexander George,15 whose path-breaking work on 
Woodrow Wilson in the 1950s retains great merit for its suggestive power to 
illuminate the nature of statecraft through the biography of statesmen. Such an 
approach is especially suggestive in the present case. In the case of the force 
and statecraft of 2002-2003, the questions that have to be answered are: To 
what extent did the personal relationship between Bush and Schröder shape 
U.S.-German discord over Iraq in 2002-2003? How significant was this personal 
relationship in comparison to other determining factors of policy and strategy as 
well as the impact of domestic politics on international relations? 
This thesis further follows the approach of John Lamberton Harper,16 who 
drew a detailed picture of three Americans whose views shaped U.S. policy 
toward Europe in World War II and its aftermath. Using a biographical method,  
 
                                            
15  Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A 
Personality Study, New Impression edition (New York: Dover Publications, 1964).   
16 John L. Harper, American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, 
and Dean G. Acheson (New York,: Cambridge University Press, 1994).  
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Harper analyzed how personal experiences and biases significantly influenced 
the conceptions and the decisions of these statesmen, and in consequence, 
American policy regarding Europe. 
To produce a reasonably comprehensive picture of the relevant features 
of George W. Bush and Gerhard Schröder, material has been gathered from 
biographies, autobiographies, interviews, and other documents that make 
possible an analysis of these two statesmen’s views. The latter sources explicitly 
include documents written by former professional colleagues. In the segment of 
the thesis that considers the period in office as head of government, most 
sources consist of academic journals and newspaper articles. The main 
emphasis is placed on the aspects of policy that are related to the transatlantic 
relationship. In the last chapter, the prelude to the Iraq War in 2002-2003 is 
discussed against the background of the previous chapters. 
The thesis concludes that the U.S. – German relationship in the 2002-
2003 Iraq crises was critically influenced by the personal relationship between 
U.S. President George W. Bush and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Any 
analysis of this crisis, that somehow gives short shrift to this vital factor of 
personality in statecraft, is surely incomplete at best.   
 11 
II.  PERSONAL BIAS: TRANSATLANTIC EXPERIENCES ON 
THE WAY TO OFFICE 
A.  GEORGE W. BUSH 
1.  Decisive Roots in Texas 
George Walker Bush was born on 6 July 1946 in New Haven, Connecticut 
and grew up as the oldest of six siblings.  As his family moved to West Texas 
when he was a two-year old child, his youth was significantly influenced by the 
way of life in Midland, Texas – a place known for the rough-and-ready style of the 
oil business, versus the New England finesse of Connecticut and the Ivy League 
that characterized the biography of his father and others in his family. One hardly 
need mention that West Texas is far from the Atlantic realm of statecraft, to say 
nothing of the mentality and mores of a man like Dean Acheson or George 
Kennan. West Texas is also far from Lower Saxony in West Germany and the 
milieu of the “Jungsozialisten” in the 1970s that loomed so large in the character 
of the other protagonist in this story.  The oil lands adjacent to Mexico brought 
the younger Bush none of the acculturation in European affairs that had been 
obligatory for an earlier generation of men who aspired to power in American life.  
 In his later years, when he studied or worked in the Northeast United 
States (with its Atlantic orientation), Texas remained a kind of haven for him. 
Even as president of the United States since 2001, he has spent most of his 
leisure time on his ranch in Crawford, Texas. George W. Bush summarized the 
way of life in Midland as follows: “Midland was a small town, with small-town 
values. We learned to respect our elders, to do what they said, and to be good 
neighbors. We went to church. Families spent time together.”17 He led a typical, 
sheltered small-town life in a conservative family and community. In his 
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autobiography and in numerous interviews, Bush emphasized his experience in 
Midland, Texas: "I would say people, if they want to understand me, need to 
understand Midland and the attitude of Midland."18  
One might ask, what are the characteristics of someone coming from 
Midland, Texas? Andrew Card, a confidant and campaigner for the Bush family 
since the 1980 New Hampshire Republican primary, described the future 
Governor of Texas and President of the United States as someone who matured 
in the course of time, but simultaneously has never given up his Texas roots. 
“He’s a tell-it-like-it-is person. He does not pick his words to obfuscate.  He is 
from the rough-and-tumble world of Midland, Texas. Your word means more than 
the contract here. In Midland, when you shake hands, that means more than your 
signature on the contract.”19  
After the family’s move to Houston, and attending a private school for 8th 
and 9th grade, George W. Bush was set on his father’s track to the power elite in 
the United States in the second half of the 20th century: the elite prep school and 
the Ivy League University. At the age of fifteen, he attended a boarding school, 
the University preparatory school in Andover, Massachusetts. He was supposed 
to enroll in a university with the best reputation afterwards. Unlike his father, 
however, George W. Bush had difficulties catching up with his classmates and 
had to spend more effort to meet the intellectual standards. After Bush graduated 
from Andover, the dean tried to talk him out of attending Yale University, since he 
was not convinced that Bush’s capabilities would be good enough to make his 
way at this particular university.20  
The experience at Andover was not only challenging in academic terms, 
but also by its distance from the Bush family in Texas. In those years, George W. 
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Bush compensated for his family’s absence with numerous acquaintances on the 
campus. His open personality and his straightforward way of addressing people 
made it easy for him to get in contact with others, and he started to build up a 
personal network. “Within months of his arrival, Bush was seen as a campus 
mover, not on the strength of his intellect or his athletic achievements, but by 
sheer force of personality. Bush was nicknamed ‘Lip’ because he had an opinion 
on everything – and sometimes a tongue sharper than necessary.”21 Despite the 
challenging standards that had to be met at Andover, he graduated and 
eventually enrolled at Yale University. 
In September 1964 (as the Vietnam War began in earnest for the U.S.), he 
started to study history at Yale University, where previously his father and 
grandfather had graduated. Besides the academic commitments, the social 
activities and networking of fraternity life were important aspects during his time 
at the university. In a commencement speech in 2001 at Yale University, he 
described his personal “take-away” from this institution as follows: “I studied 
hard, I played hard, and I made a lot of lifelong friends. What stays … is the part 
of … education you hardly ever notice at the time. It's the expectations and 
examples around you, the ideals you believe in, and the friends you make.”22 
Especially in the latter aspect, he was an exceptionally active student. He 
became the captain of the football team, the president of the fraternity “Delta 
Kappa Epsilon,” and a member of the Skull and Bones society, an elite fraternity. 
This demonstrated not only his social commitments, but also his popularity and 
his fellow students’ willingness to make him an important figure in their 
community. 
After his reserve military service (as a pilot of USAF 2d line F102s far from 
the skies of Vietnam), and some occasional vocations, including assistance in his 
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father’s political campaigns, in 1973 he decided to pursue a master’s degree at  
Harvard Business School, yet another foundation stone in the structure of U.S. 
power and achievement in state, economy and society. George W. Bush 
described the studies at Harvard as a turning point in his life and as an 
experience that influenced his thinking on economics and capitalism. “Business 
school was a turning point for me. … I had dabbled in many things, but I had no 
real idea what I wanted to do with the rest of my life when I arrived at Harvard 
Business School. … Harvard gave me the tools and the vocabulary of the 
business world.”23 This high-level education prepared him for further attempts to 
succeed in business and had its culmination when he became a member of the 
management board of a baseball team, the Texas Rangers. Bush gained his own 
Texan identity and name recognition, in his own right, and separated himself 
from his father’s legacy.24 In other words, he left his father’s vocational track for 
the first time and evolved his own foundation for a future career. 
 The year 1985 was yet another turning point in his life. He decided to 
completely quit drinking alcohol and to renew his Christian faith, which 
determined his future life.25 Since that time, he has continuously and publicly 
reflected on religious questions. For instance, he said, “I could not be governor if 
I did not believe in a divine plan that supersedes all human plans.”26 
2.  Son of the 41st President of the United States 
George W. Bush has claimed numerous times that he had reaped no 
advantages from the fact that he was the son of the 41st President of the United 
States, since his father did not become president until 1989. However, George 
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H.W. Bush had already made a bright career prior to becoming the President of 
the United States in such positions as Ambassador to the United Nations, 
Chairman of the Republican National Committee, Ambassador to China, Director 
of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Vice President of the United States for 
two terms. In the course of this pre-presidential career, George H.W. Bush had 
been building up a huge network of social contacts comprised of influential 
people in the United States. It can be assumed that at one or another moment of 
George W. Bush’s life, his father’s links might have helped to benefit him or that 
at least the family’s name had a positive influence.  
The number of published allegations on benefits from his father is 
substantial. It would be unfair, however, to argue that George W. Bush is simply 
a product of George H. W. Bush’s connections, since he eventually met all the 
necessary requirements and built up his own social networks and businesses.  
3.  Governor of Texas 
While listening to the radio in Dallas, George W. Bush heard Ann 
Richards, the incumbent Governor of Texas (D) in 1993, declaring that she had 
no idea  how to solve the state’s financial school problems. “It occurred to Bush – 
and to Karl Rove, [his future political aide] – that he had better figure out what to 
tell Texas voters about his Vision Thing.”27 This was the start of Bush’s new 
career as a politician, and he overcame his earlier halfhearted attempts at 
success in the world of the power elite. He succeeded in gathering experts 
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On 8 November 1994, George W. Bush was elected Governor of Texas. 
According to the White House biography, he became the first Governor in Texas 
history to be elected to consecutive 4-year terms when he was re-elected on 3 
November 1998.28  
The crucial force for becoming politically active was George W. Bush’s 
deep-rooted criticism of the perceived decline of moral values in politics and of 
his opponent’s apparent lack of vision. He could not understand what he saw as 
the missing “vision” of Ann Richards, then the Governor of Texas. He also 
criticized political leaders on the national level, such as President Bill Clinton, an 
enterprise in which he was hardly alone in the early and mid-1990s. In a 
polemical way, he constantly referred to Democrats in office as lacking integrity. 
“Over and over, he [George W. Bush] referred to his desire to restore dignity to 
the office, a thinly veiled reference to Clinton’s escapades with Monica Lewinsky 
and to other ethical and moral lapses of the Clinton administration.”29 This strict 
stance against the perceived erosion of values endured in the following years.  
4.  George W. Bush’s Style of Leadership 
As Governor of Texas, George W. Bush used a specific style of 
leadership, which concentrated his individual influence on the strategic decision-
making level rather than on “micromanagement.” One reason for this approach 
was his deficit in political experience, which had to be covered by the experts 
working for his office. Another factor was his vision of the actual role of a 
governor. He preferred to be a leader who gave general directives while 
articulating visions in different areas of policy. His staff was 
subsequently,charged with conducting the day-to-day work, which made the 
nomination of the staff a crucial part of his leadership.  
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I put a lot of faith and trust in my staff. I look for people who are 
smart and loyal and who share my conservative philosophy. My job 
is to set the agenda and tone and framework, to lay out the 
principles by which we operate and make decisions, and then 
delegate much of the process to them. The final decision often 
rests with me, but their judgment has a big influence.30 
His style of leadership, in terms of a high level of delegation, did not 
change in his later career.  
Since he focused strictly on visions and principles, it is necessary to 
determine these super-ordinate drivers for his decision-making process and style 
of leadership. Carolyn Thompson and James Ware comprehensively analyzed 
George W. Bush’s character and his leadership. Although some of the 
conclusions of the authors might call for criticism, the personal analysis is sound. 
“The list of Bush’s personal values is extensive: accountability, cooperation, 
freedom, fun, and others. At the top of the list, though, are three in particular. … 
Bush’s three personal core values are: 1. Family …, 2. Faith (belief in God), 
[,and] 3. Integrity (which, when intact, provides for dignity).”31 These values 
determined not only his personal behavior, but also the way he set his political 
agenda. His campaigns for governor and president reflected these ideals, and 
could be seen in his “compassionate conservatism” campaign in 2000.  
Besides his basic style of leadership, the way he leads his staff, and how 
he assigns responsibilities to his staff, deserve additional attention. Thompson 
and Ware dedicated two out of ten chapters on this particular aspect of 
leadership. “Not only does Bush have the courage to hire experts who are 
smarter than he is on various topics, but he also has the common sense and 
discipline to leave them alone to do their jobs. … They understand that their job 
                                            
30 George W. Bush, A Charge to Keep – My Journey to the White House (New York: First 
Perennial, 2001), 103. 
31 Carolyn B. Thompson and James W. Ware, The Leadership Genius of George W. Bush – 
10 Commonsense Lessons From the Commander in Chief (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 
8. 
 18 
is to do their job.”32 The “leave them alone” approach certainly motivates his staff 
members and ensures that people with the highest level of expertise handle 
complex issues. In this context, it is decisive as to which extent a close or loose 
leadership style is applied. On one hand, too close a leadership style may result 
in getting lost in micromanagement; conversely, a loose leadership style may 
imply the risk of losing control. Accordingly, George W. Bush had to be aware of 
the risks of his leadership style at all times. No evidence could be found that he 
ever lost control during his duty as governor. 
His decision to campaign for governor was a complete change in his 
career and did not follow a calculated course to gain political power, since he 
actually had no previous political career. This observation is consistent with his 
personal perception. “I’ve never plotted the various steps of my life, certainly 
never campaigned for one office to try to position myself for the next. I am more 
spontaneous than that. I live in the moment, seize opportunities, and try to make 
the most of them.”33 
5.  Campaigning for the White House in Washington, 1999-2000 
Already in his inauguration speech as Governor of Texas, George W. 
Bush stated his strong conservative conviction on how to govern, in comparison 
to liberal ideas. “Some people think it’s inappropriate to make moral judgments 
anymore. Not me. … Because for our children to have the kind of life we want for 
them, they must learn to say yes to responsibility, yes to family, yes to honesty 
and work … and not to drugs, no to violence, no to promiscuity or having babies 
out of wedlock.”34 Consequently, his campaign for president, which was once 
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more managed by his longtime aides, Karen Hughes and Karl Rove, followed the 
general idea of “compassionate conservatism.”  
The term “compassionate conservatism” referred to the conservative 
mindset of the Republicans as it had evolved since the mid-1960s, but also 
embraced the idea of aiding the disadvantaged. This compassionate theme was 
a continuation of a decisive component of George W. Bush’s previous 
campaigns, in which he stressed education for all of Texas’s youth, thereby 
enhancing vocational opportunities.  
One might allege that Bush chose this emphasis in a soberly calculated 
way to convince a wider range of voters to support him. His commitments and 
success in the “No Child Left Behind” education policy as Governor of Texas, 
however, already demonstrated his idealistic attitude. After verifying whether 
Bush only made “lip-service” or actually took action in his personal stance, the 
former soldier and political figure Colin Powell “approved of what he learned 
about Bush’s governorship. ‘To me,’ he told cheering delegates at the convention 
[the Republican nominating convention on 31 July 2000], compassionate 
conservatism was ‘just caring about people.’”35  
The campaign’s focus on conservative values and “faith-based initiatives” 
would become one of the main themes in the primaries, but this would not be 
enough to prevail in the election. Karen Hughes, who had already advised Bush 
in his campaign in Texas, knew that a focus on education had proved to be 
promising. However, on the national level, this issue would not work the same 
way, since education was mostly managed on the state level. Finally, “Bush’s 
third belief, in tax cuts, held promise. It would provide the rationale.”36 George W. 
Bush personally brought in an additional topic; he wanted to make defense an 
issue and he looked beyond the military transformation requirement of his own 
presidency. In company with his pre-election advisors in political affairs, the 
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“Vulcans,” he developed a vision of the future U.S. military. The “Vulcans” was a 
self-imposed nickname for a group of conservative intellectuals and former 
officials in previous, conservative administrations such as Richard (Dick) Cheney, 
Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Armitage.37  “The word, Vulcans, 
captured perfectly the image the Bush foreign policy team sought to convey, a 
sense of power, toughness, resilience and durability.”38 George W. Bush made 
the ideas of a new U.S. military public at The Citadel on 23 September 1999. “’I 
will defend the American people against missiles and terror’ … ‘And I will begin 
creating the military of the next century. … Even if I am elected, I will not 
command the new military we create. That will be left to a president who comes 
after me.”39 This statement is ironic in light of the events of the subsequent  
decade, especially when one considers the fate of so called “force 
transformation” and the mixed fortunes of U.S. arms in multiple theaters of 
conflict since 2001. 
Except for George W. Bush’s support for the transformation of the military, 
which had at least indirect implications for international relations, the above 
policy areas were mostly focused on domestic issues. However, George W. Bush 
had already expressed general ideas about U.S. foreign policy under his 
presidency, reflecting the unique role of the United States in the world, and its 
national interests, and stressing his personal position regarding U.S. foreign 
policy. In a presidential debate with Al Gore, the vice president and Democratic 
nominee, on 12 October 2000 he stated:  
Peace in the Middle East is in our nation's interests. Having a 
hemisphere that is free for trade and peaceful is in our nation's 
interests. Strong relations in Europe is in our nation's interests. I've 
thought a lot about what it means to be the President. I also 
understand an administration is not one person but an 
administration is [composed of] dedicated citizens who are called 
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by the President to serve the country, to serve a cause greater than  
self. And so I've thought about an administration of people who 
represent all America, but people who understand my 
compassionate and conservative philosophy.40  
In the same interview, he hinted that he had a critical standpoint toward 
nation building operations and called for a rather “humble foreign policy.” In 
November 2000, George W. Bush won the election for the presidency against the 
Democrat Al Gore, who had served as Vice-President under President Bill 
Clinton. 
6.  Germany, One European State among Others 
George W. Bush’s life and his political career as Governor of Texas was 
focused on domestic issues. His provincial-minded attitude could be observed, 
for instance, in a conversation with a journalist when, as Governor of Texas, he 
replied to a question about the “civil union” law upheld by the Vermont Supreme 
Court: “I haven’t heard anything about it. I’d only be interested if it were an issue 
in Texas.”41 
This provincial attitude did not change until he decided to run for president 
in 1997. Urged and at the same time supported by his father, he had to “learn” 
about foreign affairs on the theoretical level, not driven by personal interest and 
involvement over a longer period of time. In 1998, George H.W. Bush convinced 
Condoleezza Rice, the provost of Stanford University and a former member of 
the National Security Council staff during the senior Bush administration during 
the epoch of German unification, to conduct a series of policy seminars for his 
son in order to deepen his knowledge of foreign affairs.42 It can be assumed that 
these “classes of international relations” concentrated on the hot spots of global 
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policy with direct relevance to the United States. Despite the fact that 
Condoleezza Rice is the co-author of a noteworthy book on the 1989-1990 
German reunification process,43 it is possible that the relations between the 
United States and Germany played a small role in George W. Bush’s 
perspective.  
Statecraft between Bonn/Berlin and Washington may have played no role 
at all in Rice’s tutorials of the younger Bush, given that the unification of 
Germany had unfolded so effectively years before. Also, none of the 
contemporary fears in leading circles in Washington about a “Fourth Reich” in the 
year 1990 had a kernel of truth to them.  Further, in the attempt of the son to set 
himself apart from the record of the luminary father, one can guess that a desire 
to make his name in some other geographical area, by some other means of 
statecraft, may have played a role in the operational code of this political figure. 
In his campaign autobiography, A Charge to Keep, Germany is not mentioned at 
all and even foreign affairs are only addressed twice, each time in the context of 
free trade.44 
Since George W. Bush earned a bachelor’s degree in history with an 
emphasis on American and European history from Yale University in 1968, one 
might speculate that he had at least a reasonable knowledge of European history 
until the 1960s and that his basic views on Germany evolved during his time at 
Yale.45 Regarding the Federal German-American relationship between the end of 
World War II and his graduation date, there was a strong pro-American stance in 
the conservative governments of the Federal Republic of Germany. The first 
chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad Adenauer (1949-1963), 
and his successors, Ludwig Erhard and Kurt Georg Kiesinger (1963-1969), were 
aware of the importance of the transatlantic ally in terms of political stability, 
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European security and economic prosperity. Bush had never visited Germany 
before his first official visit as President of the United States in 2002, and he had 
no previous personal experiences in Germany. It is plain, however, that a 
divergence in life experiences set him apart from the other protagonist in this 
account, Gerhard Schröder.  
B.  GERHARD SCHRÖDER 
Gerhard Schröder began his 2006 autobiographical review of his 
decisions as leader of the German government with impressions of his youth.46 
His early experiences of poverty and perceived personal disadvantages 
characterized his growing up and his life as an adult.  
1.  Leaving Humble Conditions Behind 
Gerhard Fritz Kurt Schröder’s youth was characterized by the imperative 
to jump at rising opportunities to ensure his survival and that of his family in 
Lower Saxony. Shortly after his birth in 1944, his father died during World War II 
and left behind a wife with two children that had to live on social welfare and, 
occasionally, unskilled labor by his mother. As Gerhard Schröder put it, “‘social 
justice’ could ‘not be separated from his biography’, but ‘against the personal 
background’ of his career, he evolved a ‘very pragmatic relationship to reality and 
to the opportunities to change them.’”47 This attitude might describe Schröder’s 
high level of ambition and willpower. 
Although he graduated from lower secondary school successfully, there 
was no consideration given to attending high school (Gymnasium) for someone 
with his social roots and lack of sufficient financial means. Instead of continuing 
his formal education, he was trained and afterwards worked as a common 
retailer in a hardware store in Lower Saxony. A few years later, he decided to 
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pursue a higher level of education in addition to his fulltime job. He subsequently 
attained university entrance qualifications in 1966 and studied law. He finished 
his academic studies in 1976 and was awarded his license to practice.  
In 1978, he established a lawyer’s office in Hannover, Lower Saxony, and 
worked as a lawyer until 1990. In his occupation, he underlined that he was not 
willing to work in an ordinary way. He focused on spectacular cases such as 
defending environmental activists, gay priests and terrorists of the Red Army 
Faction (RAF), with a huge resonance in the media and the leaders of the SPD.48 
The RAF cases caused a tremendous echo in the media and created the risk of 
being associated with terrorists. Whether his vocational activities were the result 
of his sense of justice, as he suggests in his autobiography, or influenced by his 
tendency to jump at opportunities, cannot be answered conclusively. However, in 
the period 1978-1980, his political career attained extraordinary momentum, and 
his popularity was unquestionably spurred by his peculiar activities as a lawyer. 
Unlike the vast majority of graduates from lower secondary school at that 
time, Gerhard Schröder was driven by the strong will to become successful 
through education and to leave the humble social conditions of his early youth far 
behind. Schröder described his personal motivation at that time as follows: “I 
want to get out of there.”49 His early professional life shows quite clearly that he 
aspired not only to moderate success, but also to social acceptance and 
popularity. In order to achieve this, Gerhard Schröder cleverly took his own 
personal, sometimes even risky way, and was not afraid of challenging both the 
establishment of his own party and the right-of-center oriented media. 
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2.  Starting a Political Career - Activist in the Left Movement 
In the fall of 1963, as a student, Gerhard Schröder joined the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany, primarily because it would allow someone like him 
to participate in education and society.50 Furthermore, his decision to become an 
active member of the SPD was strongly influenced by his admiration for Helmut 
Schmidt, an impressive speaker, decision-maker and political actor rather than a 
theorist in political affairs, who had managed a severe flood catastrophe as 
Federal Minister of the Interior in the city-state of Hamburg in 1962.51 According 
to the party rules, because he was less than thirty-five years old, Schröder was 
automatically a member of the youth organization of the Social Democratic Party 
of Germany, the “Jusos.”  
The ideas of politically-oriented young people in the 1960s and 1970s, 
especially students at the German universities, were expressed by protests 
against the conservative establishment in general, public rejection of attempts to 
implement an emergency law in the constitution, and demonstrations against the 
U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam. The protests eventually even created a 
left-wing extra-parliamentary opposition group, and a terrorist group, the RAF. 
Additionally, these influences spread into the leftist parties in Germany. Extreme-
left activities increased in communist-related parties, and the youth organization 
of the SPD, the “Jusos,” registered an increased number of such tendencies as 
well. Since Willy Brandt, a member of the SPD, was head of the government 
from 1969 until 1974, the Social Democrats had to face not only the opposition of 
the conservatives in parliament, but also both left-wing extra-parliamentary 
opposition, and resistance within their own party. These extreme left-wing 
tendencies, in the youth organization of the SPD, severely challenged the 
development of the SPD from a Marxist-oriented party toward a moderate one,  
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which was manifested in the Bad Godesberg Program in 1959. Gerhard 
Schröder became an important protagonist in the party during this period of 
political change.  
His first significant appointment on the federal level was as leader of the 
youth organization of the SPD of Germany from 1978 to 1980, and his most 
important task was to bring the moderate SPD and the socialist youth 
organization back together. It is noteworthy that he had already been leader of 
the same organization on the state level in Lower Saxony from 1969 to 1970. On 
his way to becoming federal leader of the “Jusos,” Gerhard Schröder 
demonstrated that he aspired to higher things, and at the same time displayed 
his “make-or-break” attitude, which he underlined frequently in his later career. 
Prior to his appointment as leader in 1978, he had been asked several times to 
become a member of the federal board of the “Jusos,” but he always refused, 
asserting that he was only available for the leading position.52 
It would be incorrect to assume that Schröder was an advocate of the 
party’s establishment. Actually, he represented the extreme left wing within the 
SPD; years later it turned out that he stood for rather moderate policies and, 
therefore, it could be assumed that from his perspective, the position as leader of 
the youth organization probably was only an appropriate step for a political 
career in the SPD. Although he represented the challenging wing of the party, his 
success in uniting the party was rewarded by an offer to set him in a promising 
place on the party-list in order to become a Member of Parliament. In the event, 
Schröder was not dependent on the party-list, since he won his electoral district, 
Hannover Land, and, therefore, got a direct mandate to the Bundestag, the 
German Parliament, in 1980.53 
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Since Gerhard Schroeder was a backbencher, he soon realized that his 
influence on day-to-day politics on the national level was limited. To improve his 
personal standing in the party and his potential for a successful political career, 
he kept the regional aspects of Lower Saxony in focus. “He knew: If he wished to 
become a successful politician on the national level, he first had to make his way 
in his home state. He had to become State Governor of Lower Saxony.” 54 
Gerhard Schröder’s priorities, especially as leader of the “Jusos,” were 
presumably influenced by his instinct for opportunities and his assessment of 
expected positive impacts on his career. In this context, Gerhard Schröder stated 
his thinking as follows: “A political party is not solely about politics in the narrow 
sense, it is also about careers. A political appointment is not exclusively a service 
for the whole of society, but also a sort of recognition of the power of personal 
interest, and the fulfillment of vanity. It would be nonsense to deny that.”55  
In pursuit of success, his focus was clearly on the regional level of Lower 
Saxony. The national level could only be a second step, and it can be assumed 
that international politics played an inferior role for Schröder at that time. 
However, a strong opposition to capitalism, which was, from a left-wing 
perspective, represented by the United States, as well as protests against the 
U.S. involvement in Vietnam, determined attitudes to the United States in 
Schröder’s left-wing youth branch of the SPD.  
3.  State Governor in Lower Saxony 
a.  The Path into Office 
In 1983, Gerhard Schröder gained political influence as elected 
leader of the SPD district of Hannover, the largest district in Lower Saxony. From 
his personal perspective, this was an excellent position to become the top 
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candidate for the SPD in the upcoming race for State Governor of Lower Saxony. 
Since the former candidate of the SPD had resigned, Schröder regarded himself 
as the appropriate successor.  
Against the strategy of the party leaders on the state level, and the 
common practice of the SPD (i.e., letting the national party headquarters in Bonn 
choose the candidate after confidential discussions), Schröder did not wait for the 
announcement of an alternative candidate, but actively used the media to assert 
his claim for the upcoming campaign. SPD leaders were outraged about the 
misbehavior of the less favored “leftie” from Hannover and nominated two rival 
candidates in order to prevent Schröder from gaining even more power.56 In this 
situation, Gerhard Schröder demonstrated his remarkable skills to build political 
alliances, to convince undecided political figures of the SPD, and to inspire the 
common members of the party. Finally, in a crucial vote at the state party 
congress, he asserted himself with overwhelming endorsements and became the 
top candidate for the elections in Lower Saxony in 1986. Despite his personal 
success, his self-centered behavior led to distinct skepticism and to a kind of 
mistrust within the SPD, especially on the federal level. 
In the election campaign, Schröder focused on a coalition with the 
recently established party of the Greens that had been part of the state 
parliament since 1982, in order to increase his chances against the conservative 
incumbent of the CDU, Ernst Albrecht. This would have been the first time that 
the Greens became a partner of a government coalition. Schröder stated, “The 
cooperation of the SPD and the Greens is not an end in itself, but a means to an 
end. The idea is to enable an alliance of employees and educated middle class 
to engage in politics. This seems to be the only appropriate one, to resolve the 
problems of the last twenty years of the 20th century.”57 A short time later, again 
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using the media to create facts in public, he completely turned his back on this 
idea, which hardened the common allegation of Schröder’s opportunism.  
Eventually, Schröder lost the elections. Even his instrumentalization 
of the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe, in accordance with popular desires to 
abolish nuclear power, could not change the result. However, the final phase of 
his campaign demonstrated, for the first time, his ability to exploit suddenly 
arising topics to his own advantage. 
Four years later, in 1990, he dared a second attempt for office. 
Schröder succeeded in the election by conducting a media-focused campaign, 
which was based on his popular personality rather than on real political issues. 
He later admitted that his campaign had more to do with show than policies.58  
b.  Gerhard Schröder as State Governor in Lower Saxony 
As State Governor of Lower Saxony, Schröder led a coalition 
consisting of the SPD and the Greens, a so-called red-green coalition, a first for 
the Federal Republic of Germany for a full four-year term. Skillful, he understood 
how to keep the Greens aligned, even in situations in which the coalition partner 
had to make allowances in key interest areas. In retrospect, he described his 
relationship to the Greens as follows: “In this way, Lower Saxony was thoroughly 
a testing ground, on which the resilience of a possible red-green coalition on the 
federal level had been tried out.”59 From the SPD perspective, the coalition was 
much more successful than in the eyes of the Greens. A poll, in the summer of 
1992, published a satisfaction rate of 73 percent among the Social Democrats, 
but only 60 percent within the Green Party.60 This underlined the fact that the 
Greens had to compromise more than the SPD with its dominating State 
Governor.  
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Schröder’s views on economic affairs were subject to change. The 
former leader of the “Jusos,” who had in the past called for “collectivization” and 
“abolishment of the current economic system,” conducted a “salto capitale” (“a 
complete turn”) and learned to utilize his close relationships with economic 
leaders.61 At that time, the media created the term “Genosse der Bosse,” 
“comrade of the bosses,” which reflected his completely new approach toward 
the economy, one that lasted through the rest of his political career.62 On the 
other hand, he demonstrated consistency in terms of having an adroit hand for 
high-publicity events. To prevent a hostile takeover of the companies 
“Continental” in 1992 and “Preussag Stahl AG” in 1998, the government of Lower 
Saxony successfully intervened and saved the jobs of thousands of employees.63 
The latter achievement indisputably spurred his election campaign for a third 
term as State Governor, even though his candidacy for the chancellery had 
already been announced. Once again, Gerhard Schröder demonstrated his 
outstanding capability to lead a campaign successfully. 
c.  Becoming Candidate for Chancellor 
The increasing popularity of Gerhard Schröder as State Governor 
of Lower Saxony spurred his ambition to gain more importance on the federal 
level. From his perspective, the time was ripe when the incumbent chairman of 
the national SPD, Björn Engholm, had to resign due to a political scandal. Once 
more, he used the media offensively to apply as the first candidate for this 
position, to force his candidacy on the party by public demand. It turned out to be 
a miscalculation, since his approach caused a high level of reluctance within the 
national SPD, which favored alternative candidates such as Rudolph Scharping 
or Oskar Lafontaine. According to polls in 1993, there was a predominant level of 
public support for Schröder to become the most promising candidate as 
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chancellor, but the party and its leadership were suspicious of him. For the first 
time in SPD history, instead of a decision by the party leaders, a candidate was 
announced and then elected, and Rudolph Scharping became the chairman of 
the party.  He eventually ran against Helmut Kohl for chancellor in 1994.64  
In 1998, Gerhard Schröder became the official candidate for 
chancellor of the SPD for the national elections because polls backed the 
assumption that the Social Democrats, with Schröder, could oust Helmut Kohl. 
However, the common practice of keeping the candidacy for chancellor and the 
chairmanship of the party in one hand was broken. Consequently, a rivalry 
between the future chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, and the chairman of the party, 
Oskar Lafontaine, was unavoidable.   
The party’s decisions in 1994 and 1998 underlined Gerhard 
Schröder’s dichotomy; he was particularly loved by the masses, but regarded 
with distrust by the party’s establishment. Without popularity and the support of 
the masses, Schröder would have had tremendous problems maintaining his 
success and his power. At the same time, as chancellor, he would have to use 
this popularity in order to cope with three opponents: the parliamentary 
opposition, the coalition partner, and finally, his own party. 
d.  Foreign Affairs – International Relations 
Gerhard Schröder’s entire career, until 1998, was predominantly 
influenced by domestic politics. The World Socialists summarized his political 
career, in the same year on their website, by discerning a kind of provincialism. 
“Examining Gerhard Schröder's career as a whole, one is forced to conclude that 
the man … is one whose political views and perspectives have developed in an 
area of activity spanning just 300 kilometres between Lemgo, Göttingen, 
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Hannover and – for a very short period – Bonn.”65 In this respect, his biography 
resembled a key feature of that of George Bush as governor of Texas. 
This retrospective evaluation by the World Socialists, certainly 
influenced by their disappointment about the former socialist model-politician who 
turned into a successful mediator between business leaders and government 
policy-makers instead of fighting capitalism, underlines his overall regional-
minded politics. Despite its general relevance, this assumption did not hold 
entirely true in detail. Although a State Governor has only limited possibilities to 
influence the nation’s foreign policies, Schröder already had at least an idea of 
how he would shape international relations.  
From Schröder’s perspective, the use of the armed forces can 
scarcely be the centerpiece of a foreign policy that should engage peaceful 
means of statecraft and diplomacy. For instance, during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, 
which was supported by a vast multinational coalition against Iraq after Baghdad 
invaded Kuwait, Schröder was a strict opponent of the use of force against Iraq 
and consequently called for diplomatic solutions under the auspices of the 
international community.66 It can be assumed that this stance reflected his firm 
conviction and was not an expression of his opportunism, because the majority of 
Germans and even his party supported the engagement of the coalition. His 
stance accorded with that of the opposition SPD of the early 1990s and reflected 
a long held tenet of West German statecraft since the early 1950s –  to avoid all 
extra-Central European military adventures and entanglements. 
4.  Campaigning for the Chancellery in Berlin 
Gerhard Schröder demonstrated once more his “make-or-break” attitude 
when he decided to run for chancellor in 1997. He surprised the SPD and the 
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public by his announcement that he would not be available for an appointment as 
a Federal Minister, but only as chancellor.67 His popularity among the center of 
the entire electoral spectrum promised the opportunity to oust the incumbent 
chancellor, Helmut Kohl, after sixteen years in office. Like the two new successful 
heads of government in the 1990s, Tony Blair in the United Kingdom and Bill 
Clinton in the United States, Gerhard Schröder was reform-minded and a left-
wing politician with close ties to the entrepreneurial business community and he 
represented the “New Center.” Schröder consequently campaigned on change in 
Germany and focused the campaign on his personality by contrasting it to his 
predecessor’s and by emphasizing his modern views, as did the other 
representatives of the “New Center.” The BBC News noted on the election 
weekend, “Germany is ripe for change. It is no longer the country of Oktoberfest 
and steel, but the Berlin Love Parade and software. With more than 4 million 
unemployed and investment flooding out of the country, it is not hard to see why 
many would like to see a change at the top.”68 
The American media did not see similarities between Schröder and the 
other protagonists of the “New Center,” since the German candidate still 
supported an extensive welfare state. However, CNN evaluated Schröder’s 
campaign at least as a successful attempt to convince the German electorate of 
his Blair-like personality. “Nevertheless, in a country grown stale after 16 years of 
Kohl, Schroeder successfully sold himself as a breath of fresh air.”69  
Besides staking a claim to modernity, Schröder also focused on important 
domestic issues that appealed to the voters. Time Magazine summarized his 
promises as follows: “During his 1998 campaign, Schröder promised to create 
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jobs, pump up the eastern part of the country, turn the entire republic into a high-
tech paradise and, tellingly, get the jobless rolls down to 3.5 million.”70 The future 
international relations of the Federal Republic of Germany played only a minor 
role during the entire campaign in 1998 and can be summarized by Schröder’s 
announcement of “continuity” in German foreign policy.  
5.  The United States, Ruler of the World 
Despite Schröder’s extreme shift toward promoting economic growth 
during his time as State Governor in Lower Saxony, his socialist, or at least his 
social democratic roots, were still distinctive. His economic approach was 
determined by necessary compromises on policy. In his function as State 
Governor, he was a member of the executive board of Volkswagen, one of the 
most important employers in Lower Saxony, and demonstrated his ability to 
mediate between labor and management in order to include all relevant interests. 
From his personal perspective, this understanding of the relationship between 
business and government is superior to pure capitalism. “The structure of our 
society is in many areas, as the example of Volkswagen shows, less prone to the 
dominance of pure speculative interests. In this aspect we stand out from the 
United States in a positive way.”71  Volkswagen, with its central role in the West 
German social market economy, represented something quite different from the 
free hand, laissez-faire approach to the market that one finds in the University of 
Chicago School of Economics and the Hoover Institution.  Although Gerhard 
Schröder did not express direct resentments against the United States, or even 
anti-Americanism, his statement suggests at least a skeptical bias of what the 
United States stands for in terms of the unfettered nature of the market and the 
role of government in the political economy.  
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This skeptical stance is not limited to the relationship between government 
and business, but also applies to the policy-making process. In 1993, he warned 
his party not to shift the SPD’s strategy toward the example of the U.S. 
Democrats. He based his advice not only on historical reasons, but on his 
judgment that the Democrats were guided by the views of a top candidate 
instead by a political program, an approach that would result in an erosion of 
political assets within the party.72 In this context, he also criticized the 
progressive de-politization of U.S. society. Ironically, a few years later, similar 
assessments led to internal disputes within the party addressed to Gerhard 
Schröder himself, when he was chancellor and leader of the SPD (see chapter III 
2b.). The above statements and assessments bring out Schröder’s skeptical view 
of the United States and his tendency to compare German and American politics.  
Schröder’s bias can also be seen in other aspects of politics. Conservative 
governments in Washington seem to have attracted his attention. In a review, he 
mentioned that he recognized parallels among the conservative U.S. Presidents 
in the last decades. “In the mid-eighties, Ronald Reagan evoked the war of good 
against evil referring to the Old Testament message, whereas he of course 
thought of the communists as the evil ones.” 73 
These images of the United States might have caused an ambivalent view 
of the U.S.-German relationship during his subsequent service as chancellor. He 
was torn between gratefulness to the United States for providing safety and 
prosperity during the Cold War on one hand, and skepticism about U.S. 
economic arrangements on the other. 
Another example of Schröder’s apparent bias against conservatives in 
general, and U.S. conservatives in particular, is his assessment of the role of a 
political leader in society. He is critical of the type of political control that raises a 
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claim to “spiritual-moral leadership“ and expands political competences into 
society. Referring to Helmut Schmidt’s farewell speech in the national parliament 
in 1986, Schröder holds that the aspects of social life must be addressed by the 
society itself and not by political leaders. “Especially, this way of responsibility-
imperialism causes distrust against power to a large extent.”74 
C.  CONCLUSION 
The careers of George W. Bush and Gerhard Schröder have been 
different in the aspects of social origins, political and social ideologies, and 
indeed, world views, as well as fundamental assumptions about power in the 
international system of states. The former grew up in an influential family 
providing the best possible education as the optimal precondition for a later 
career. Within a vast elite social network, he benefited from financial 
independence and family support to move to the pinnacle of U.S. power and 
influence. Besides the extensive backing by his family, Bush’s personal ability to 
inspire other people was the decisive force for his eventual success. Until his 
mid-forties, he was still looking for his personal profession and finally found it in 
serving as Governor of Texas and later as President of the United States. His 
campaigns were firmly focused on domestic issues and moral values. American 
foreign policy played a minor role and was limited to the potential members of his 
cabinet, rather than his personal interests in international relations, or his 
personal ideas on how to shape foreign policy. In this context, the advisor group,  
the “Vulcans,” influenced his view on the future American role, since they were  
the people who taught him this area of politics. 
Bush understood his position within the government as the leading figure 
responsible for the strategic ideas that had to be realized by his staff in day-to-
day operations. This particular stance would give the maximum amount of 
responsibility to his cabinet and underlined the importance of the wise 
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recruitment of his staff. The future President of the United States would rely, to a 
large extent, on the advice and information provided by his staff. 
In contrast to George W. Bush, Gerhard Schröder came from a humble 
background and was obliged to climb the social hierarchy by tremendous 
personal efforts, and with the opportunities afforded by the rise of social 
democracy in West Germany, in the years from 1968 to 1998. He started his 
political career much earlier than his American counterpart and contrived to 
enhance his popularity in his early years. As an attorney, he fought cases with a 
huge resonance in the media and assumed the chair of the “Jusos” in order to 
shape his profile within the party. His ability to sense emerging opportunities and 
the changing moods of the population, combined with his skill at taking 
advantage of the media in his favor, made it possible for him to gain acceptance 
in the wide center of the electoral spectrum.  
The high popular approval rates did not apply to his party. The national 
party board, with its more conservative understanding of social democracy in the 
1960s and 1970s, was skeptical about the rising star in Lower Saxony. This 
skepticism was caused not only by his meteoric success, but especially by his 
self-assured, if not arrogant, way of bringing himself into the focus of public 
perception. Another aspect of harsh critique within his party, as well as by his 
political opponents, was the alleged opportunism of Schröder’s career. He shifted 
his political stance from an extreme left viewpoint to serving as mediator between 
society and business, and finally developed the conviction that a blossoming 
economy is one of the most important pillars of the welfare state. The latter 
approach was far too conservative and business-oriented for many members of 
the SPD.  
During his service as State Governor, and later during the campaign for 
the chancellery, the relationship between Gerhard Schröder and his party was 
ambivalent. After four terms in the opposition on the national level, the SPD 
needed his popularity to oust the incumbent Helmut Kohl, but at the same time, 
numerous members of the party establishment had the feeling that Schröder was 
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not really convinced of their ideals. Gerhard Schröder was always someone who 
relied on his own capabilities and instincts rather than on the advice and support 
of others.  
By comparing the careers of Bush and Schröder, one can see that their 
origins were completely different and that their decision-making and leadership 
styles also differed vastly. George W. Bush was a straightforward leader from the 
South, driven by moral values and a view for the “big picture,” in the sense of 
mythical Texas and the worldviews of men who own baseball clubs. He was, 
moreover, someone who relied on the skills and knowledge of his staff in a style 
of management that embraced a maximum of delegation, as taught at the 
Harvard School of Business, and as practiced by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. In 
contrast, Gerhard Schröder was a pragmatist with a sophisticated sense of 
current popular demands and an ability to relate to the masses, even beyond his 
own political party. Schröder concentrated political power in his own hands rather 
than delegating it to others.  
Surely, their attitudes toward the U.S.-German relationship were different. 
George W. Bush’s stance can be characterized as subdued and more or less 
ambivalent, since from his perspective, Germany (and Europe as a whole), 
played no decisive role in international relations. Schröder’s notion of the United 
States was more salient. He was fully aware of the importance of the 
transatlantic partner, but at the same time, his picture of the United States 
contained a mixture of elements. He perceived American politics as superficial 
and inferior, but had a subliminal admiration for the general idea of the liberal 
American economy.  
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III.  SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY 
A.  PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH 
Due to legal disputes over the Florida ballot, the presidential elections in 
2000 were not settled until almost six weeks prior to the inauguration, which 
reduced the regular period for assigning the White House personnel by more 
than four weeks. As outlined above, this process plays a crucial role for George 
W. Bush, since he leads his team by general guidelines, and afterwards, lets the 
experts carry out the policy with minimal direct supervision. During his time in 
office as Governor of Texas, he required from staff members not only expertise, 
but also special attributes such as loyalty and affinity for his ideas. Furthermore, 
the president-elect was well aware of his lack of experience in relations with the 
U.S. Congress and in foreign affairs. Besides George W. Bush’s recently gained 
but not experience-based knowledge in foreign affairs, this particular policy area 
of the United States would essentially be determined by the key personnel in the 
posts of Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense and his personal national 
security advisors in the White House.  
In his first speech after the election, George W. Bush stressed an 
additional aspect that should influence the building of the White House Staff. "I 
was not elected to serve one party, but to serve one nation. The President of the 
United States is the President of every single American, of every race and every 
background. Whether you voted for me or not, I will do my best to serve your 
interests, and I will work to earn your respect.”75 
1.  Building the Government 
After the announcement of Dick (Richard Bruce) Cheney as Bush’s 
running mate in July 2000, the first evaluation of possible candidates for cabinet 
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positions began and continued directly after the elections, even before the 
Supreme Court had finally settled the election in Bush’s favor. Cheney, the 
former White House Chief of Staff under President Gerald Ford in 1974 and 
Secretary of Defense during the presidency of George H.W. Bush in 1989, was 
an experienced politician with extensive insights regarding Washington’s political 
establishment and experience as a CEO in a company. “He [Bush] wanted 
Cheney because of Cheney’s experience in foreign affairs (which Bush lacked). 
He wanted Cheney because Cheney had had a long career in politics (which 
Bush lacked). He wanted Cheney because Cheney was patient and calm (which 
Bush struggled with).”76  
Accordingly, Cheney was an appropriate personality to cover George W. 
Bush’s deficits regarding the capitol’s political insights. At the same time, this 
meant a considerable leap of faith, since Cheney became the decisive actor in 
selecting cabinet candidates before Bush could focus on this issue due to his 
involvement in the election campaign.  
In company with Cheney, Bush continued this selection process. When 
the post of the Secretary of Defense was discussed, Cheney suggested Donald 
Rumsfeld, who was a deep-rooted conservative and could outweigh the influence 
of the new moderate Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who was an acknowledged 
expert in the military. “Rumsfeld had been Cheney’s mentor when the new vice 
president-elect had first entered government in the 1970s. Cheney knew him to 
be a tough customer who could more than hold his own against Powell.”77 
Rumsfeld had already held the position of Secretary of Defense during Gerald 
Ford’s presidency in 1975-1977, had served as a member of Congress for 
several terms and as the U.S. Ambassador to NATO in 1973. Rumsfeld had even 
started to run for president in 1988 against the then-Vice President, George H.W. 
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Bush, but withdrew. In the periods between official positions, he worked in 
different companies as an advisor or chief executive.   
In an interview, Rumsfeld promptly impressed George W. Bush with his 
frank nature and his clear ideas on how to conduct the transformation of the U.S. 
military to high-tech forces, consistent with Bush’s vision of the modernization of 
the armed forces. “It was as if he [Rumsfeld] already had a plan. Rumsfeld was 
43 when he had the job a quarter century ago. It was as if he were now saying, ‘I 
think I’ve got some things I’d like to finish.’”78  George W. Bush’s decision for 
Rumsfeld was clearly against his father’s advice, who assumed from personal 
experience in Republican politics “that Rumsfeld was arrogant, self-important, too 
sure of himself and Machiavellian.”79  
The State Department was to be led by Colin Powell, a former four-star 
general and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) during the Gulf War in 
1990-1991, who already gathered White House insights in the Reagan 
administration in 1987-1989 as the President’s National Security Advisor. Powell 
was regarded as a rather moderate politician, who could have served under a 
Democratic president as well. He also had served as CJCS during the Clinton 
administration. In this capacity, he had set new limits on the political role of 
soldiers in the making of U.S. foreign policy. He had been a major force in 
defining the limits on U.S. military power seen as “lessons of Vietnam,” and had 
also been a major obstacle to U.S. intervention in Southeastern Europe in the 
1990s. Powell stressed the large differences between the neo-conservative and 
moderate factions in his last meeting with President George W. Bush prior to his 
retirement in 2004. “Bush needed to begin his new term by paying serious 
attention to the poisoned relations between his State and Defense departments. 
Senior officials in Rumsfeld’s office at the Pentagon were actively and 
dangerously undermining the president’s diplomacy.”80   
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In 1999 Condoleezza Rice, after an initial meeting with George W. Bush in 
Austin and persuaded by George H.W. Bush in the Bush family compound in 
Kennebunkport, agreed to teach the candidate for president about foreign affairs 
and to join his campaign as foreign policy advisor.81 Already during George H.W. 
Bush’s administration, Rice had served as the Soviet and East European Affairs 
Advisor with a key role in the unification of Germany and the reform of relations 
with the Russian Federation. Immediately before her assignment to the White 
House in 2001, she was professor of political science and provost at Stanford 
University. Like Colin Powell, Rice had maintained close ties to the Bush family. 
The government of the United States, under the presidency of George W. 
Bush, consisted of experienced personnel capable of compensating for the new 
president’s lack of experience in foreign affairs and decision-making in 
Washington. When Colin Powell decided to join the administration, his 
assignment demonstrated the moderate element of Bush’s campaign, whereas 
Rumsfeld represented the conservative faction. The configuration of personalities 
in the White House represented an attempt to unite the divided population after 
the closely contested election, and at the same time, implied the risk of political 
cleavages within the administration. The strong personalities of Dick Cheney and 
Donald Rumsfeld, both more experienced and older than Bush, spurred rumors 
from the onset that he would be led, rather than serving as the leader.  
2.  Presidency in a Unipolar World 
When George W. Bush took office, he became the president of the only 
global superpower. The tendency to focus on unilateral political approaches in 
foreign policy after the end of the Cold War had been initiated by his 
predecessor, Bill Clinton.  
Geir Lundestad summarized the American position, at the beginning of the 
3rd millennium with regards to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the military and 
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economic power of the United States, and the military successes since 1991 as 
follows: “If the twentieth century belonged to the United States, the twenty-first 
will presumably be even more American.”82  
For the area of international relations, it is important how other countries, 
especially the U.S. allies, perceive this situation, since misperceptions can never 
be excluded. François Heisbourg, Chairman of the Geneva Centre for Security 
Policy, categorized the different possible perceptions of the United States in a 
unipolar world, shortly before Bush was elected, as follows: First, the United 
States as the “benign hegemon,” characterized by attributes such as being 
“strong rather than brutal; candid and possibly naïve, rather than sly or crafty.” 
Secondly, the “U.S. as a rogue state,” certainly a provocative term that stresses 
the perception “that the United States is not acting as a status quo power.” 
Thirdly, the “trigger-happy sheriff” who emphasizes “military power as a tool of 
foreign policy, at the expense of the complexities of diplomacy and other forms of 
‘soft’ power.” Finally, the perception of the United States as a “keystone of world 
order” in terms of a “guarantor of last resort, the only global-scale exporter of 
security.”83  
George W. Bush was well aware of the exposed role of the United States 
and his special position, which was consistent with his notion of following 
strategic visions. “The job of the president … is to think strategically so that you 
can accomplish big objectives. As opposed to playing mini-ball. You can’t play 
mini-ball with the influence we have and expect there to be peace. You’ve gotta 
think, think BIG.”84 Bush and his administration sought to shape international 
relations in favor of the United States and to influence the perceptions of U.S. 
allies and other countries. 
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3.  Leader of the Government in a Presidential System 
The President of the United States and his administration are the decisive 
actors in shaping foreign policy. However, he cannot completely and arbitrarily 
change the nation’s policies or even authorize the use of force. Although the 
president is the Commander in Chief and has a direct link to the military, “the 
Constitution grants Congress considerable authority over decisions to use 
force.”85   
Under the umbrella of checks and balances, Congress, with its power of 
the purse and its power to require reports from the executive, plays an important 
role. It is important to what extent Congress and the White House actually bring 
influence to bear on specific issues. Among others, Robert Zoellick, former 
Under-Secretary of State and Deputy Chief of Staff at the White House during 
the George H.W. Bush administration, analyzed the current relationship after the 
Cold War and derived concrete suggestions for both Congress and the 
Executive.86  
During the Cold War era, the influence of allies on U.S. foreign policy 
could be observed in a number of international events such as the Nuclear Test 
Ban Negotiations (1958-1963), the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), and the planned 
installation of the “Neutron Bomb” in Europe (1970s).87 After the Cold War, the 
bargaining power of small allies had decreased, but it had not been eliminated. 
George W. Bush could exercise his power in 2001 without extensive 
resistance in Congress, since the Republicans held the majority. However, the 
past had shown that even the majority of the presidential party in Congress did 
not necessarily support the policy of the White House (e.g., in the final phase of 
the Vietnam War under Richard Nixon), and even single members of Congress 
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actually have the opportunity to request reports from the White House. The 
constitutional powers of Congress obliged the president to choose a foreign 
policy with support on Capitol Hill.  
B.  CHANCELLOR GERHARD SCHRÖDER 
Gerhard Schröder’s first tenure in office was influenced by such foreign 
policy issues as the extension of NATO and the EU to the East, and the 
upheavals in the Balkans, including the Kosovo conflict. In this thesis, the main 
emphasis is laid on the impact of these external factors on German politics and 
the consequences for U.S.-German relations. Domestic issues are reflected to 
the extent that they had consequences for international relations. In this context, 
the parties of the governing coalition, the SPD, and the Greens (Die Grünen), 
draw special attention.  
1.  Leader of the Government in a Consensual System 
a.  The Process of Building the Government 
Soon after the national elections on 27 September 1998, the 
negotiations for a coalition agreement between the SPD and the Greens began. 
The latter was undoubtedly the junior partner with 6.7 percent for the Greens and 
40.9 percent for the SPD of the national electorate.88  
It is the nature of coalitions in a consensual system that differing 
political positions have to be discussed and eventually compromised. A 
quantitative analysis of both parties’ manifestos reveals that there was a broad 
coherence on sociopolitical topics, but huge differences in environmental 
protection and foreign policy.89  
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b.  Cleavages within the Coalition Parties 
Besides conceptual cleavages between the SPD and the Greens,  
huge differences within both parties also had to be overcome. The Greens were 
divided into a middle-class faction (“Realos”), represented by the new Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer, and a rather left faction (“Fundis”) that derived 
from and was still influenced by the student movements of the 1960s. At the 
same time, the SPD had a center-left wing (“The New Center”) with the 
chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, and a faction of the left, represented by the new 
Finance Minister and chairman of the SPD, Oskar Lafontaine, who had a 
stronger backing in the party than the chancellor candidate. In April 1998, the 
British newspaper The Guardian commented on Schröder’s political career with 
regard to the peculiar relationship between him and his party: 
He [Schröder] needs the SPD to realise his ambitions and the party 
needs him as its most formidable political operator and vote-winner. 
But it is an ambivalent and mutually suspicious relationship. For 
Schröder, the SPD is the vehicle to power. But he takes the main 
line to the masses via the media, bypassing the SPD apparatus. 
Schröder, like Kohl, is what the Germans call a Machtmensch – a 
man of power.90 
c.  Rivalry between the Chancellor and the SPD-Chairman 
In addition to the ambivalent relationship between Schröder and his 
party, on the individual level, open tensions arose between him and his Finance 
Minister, Oskar Lafontaine, which soon led to legislative inconsistency. The 
chancellor could hardly determine the government’s policy in his well-known, 
pragmatic way when the SPD chairman, Oskar Lafontaine, followed his own 
agenda. In March 1999, John Schmid identified this cleavage as the cause of the 
absence of a clear path in German politics. “The new government, which is 
openly split between Mr. Schröder's pragmatist wing and Mr. Lafontaine's rival 
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clique of old-style socialists, has come under fire for a series of inconsistent 
pronouncements and policy reversals. The government already has confounded 
voters with zigzags on plans.”91 Only after the resignation of Lafontaine on 10 
March 1999, following numerous quarrels with the chancellor, could Gerhard 
Schröder align the ministries and determine both domestic and foreign policies. 
Additionally, Schröder became chairman of the SPD and finally had the 
necessary power to realize his ideas. However, this did not change the 
ambivalent relationship between the chancellor and the party’s base in a 
sustainable manner.  
Officially, in order to foster the “dialogue-process” with society, as a 
consequence of the concentration of executive power in his hands, Schröder 
established numerous expert-groups or commissions, such as the “Hartz-
Kommission” to reorganize the job market.92 These groups often presented their 
results like political events with large media coverage, and this provided the 
chancellor with publicity and political credit. One might criticize this process, 
since the parliament was at least partially bypassed and the popular focus was 
directed to only one political actor. Due to his relatively unstable standing in the 
party, Schröder was continuously obliged to maintain his popularity. However, on 
6 February 2004, owing to the party’s pressure, he had to hand over the post of 
chairman of the SPD to Franz Müntefering. 
d.  The Coalition Agreement on Foreign Affairs 
For both Gerhard Schröder and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Joschka Fischer, aligning their own parties, especially on issues related to 
foreign affairs, turned out to be a huge challenge. The objectives of the coalition 
agreement (released on 20 October 1998), which generally followed the policy of 
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the former center-right government in foreign affairs, stated that NATO was the 
indispensable instrument for the stability and security of Europe, and explicitly 
embraced bilateral relations with the United States of America.93   
Frank Pfetsch investigated the subsequent coalition documents and 
identified some amendments to the basic guidelines in detail.94 Besides conflict 
prevention, peaceful conflict settlement, and respect for human rights, strong 
emphasis was placed on the legal regulation of international relations.  As a 
consequence, Schröder and Fischer continuously stressed the legal basis (e.g., 
UN Security Council resolutions) for the use of military force, in the subsequent 
years, in order to comply with the requirements of the left wings in both parties. 
The weekly newspaper Die Zeit evaluated the coalition 
government’s performance after the first one hundred days in office critically, “To 
put it mildly, the cooperation is in need of improvement. One might … discount it 
as regular teething problems. However, it is less excusable, that the social 
democrats gained power without adequate preparation.  There was no lack of 
objectives, but there was a lack of ideas of how to achieve them.”95 
2.  Challenges for the Red-Green Coalition in Foreign Affairs 
Due to the constellation of the coalition and the cleavage within both 
parties, the initial phase of Gerhard Schröder’s government was rather difficult. 
The stability of the coalition was tested by external factors soon after it took 
office. The red-green government had to cope with two issues in foreign affairs: 
first, the upcoming Kosovo conflict implied a breaking test, although the 
foundation for the employment of the German armed forces had already been set 
by the previous government, and second, the Iraq crisis in 1998-1999 determined 
the agenda in foreign affairs.  
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The decision of the German Supreme Court in July 1994 already 
authorized German out-of-area operations and marked a new quality in the use 
of force, but stressed in this context, the decisive role of the German parliament, 
the Bundestag. “The Constitutional Supreme Court made very clear that all 
activities of the armed forces [e.g. operations in the former Yugoslavia since 
1993] are in accord with the constitution – however, in such cases the 
government is obliged to gain a majority vote of the parliament in advance. A 
specific law should govern the parliamentary procedure in the future.”96 The 
regulating law was not passed until 18 March 2005.97 However, all operations of 
the armed forces prior to that time were authorized in accordance with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in 1994. The term “Parliament’s Army” for the German 
military derived from the decisive role of the parliament for any operation of the 
German armed forces. The comprehensive commitments of the Kohl government 
in Bosnia proved the ability and willingness of re-united Germany to fulfill its 
international obligations, although this change involved a slow process in society.  
Against the massive internal opposition of the pacifists and the far left 
wings of both coalition parties, Gerhard Schröder had to gather a majority in 
parliament in order to employ German troops in NATO’s intervention in the 
Kosovo conflict in 1999. This is of special relevance, since the lack of a UN 
Security Council mandate challenged the fundamental directives of the coalition-
agreement. According to Schröder, “It was perfectly clear, that this question 
would decide whether [the] red-green [coalition] was able to govern or we would 
just take a short guest role on the government bench.”98 His extraordinary 
personal commitment underlined the relevance of NATO and the moral aspect of 
this war in his eyes. Later, he underlined the importance of NATO for his policy at 
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this time. “It was clear to me, that the necessary loyalty in the Atlantic alliance 
would be the acid test for the ability of the red-green coalition to govern.”99 Since 
the end of 1998, German soldiers were deployed in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), since June 1999 in Kosovo for the KFOR 
Operation under UN SCR 1244, and since fall 1999 in FYROM in operation 
Amber Fox.100 In other words, the red-green government shifted its stance on the 
use of force significantly in favor of the chancellor’s political guideline. 
Schröder’s first months in office were dominated by efforts to mediate 
among the numerous factions in government instead of leading the coalition.101 
He ensured that foreign and security policies, with regard to the United Kingdom 
and the United States, the German position demonstrated continuity and 
reliability. “The government handled the two most urgent foreign-policy 
challenges with amazing pragmatism: The Kosovo War and the Iraq crisis. … 
And who had expected that the green Minister for Foreign Affairs would swallow 
his critique, when Americans and Britons were bombing Baghdad?”102 
3.  Regency in a Growing Europe 
After re-unification, Germany found its place again in the heart of Europe. 
In the 1990s, the Kohl government appreciated the nation’s central role and 
shaped intra-European relations in a progressive and endorsable way. The 1998 
campaign offered the first signs that there might be a shift in European politics in 
the future. According to a British study in 1998, “The SPD election campaign 
emphasized German interests in Europe, and Mr Schröder’s campaign rhetoric 
was much less ‘European’ than Chancellor Kohl’s. Chancellor Kohl was a 
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committed ‘Europeanist’ and at the forefront of moves towards political and 
economic integration. Mr Schröder is more cautious about the EU.”103 His first 
articulations on the European stage (“I want my money back”) confirmed that 
Schröder was willing to stick to the promises of his populist campaign. With 
regard to his approach to European policy, the corresponding observations at 
that time were critical. “Above all, the impudent, sometimes aggressive diction of 
the chancellor is irritating. Everybody realized that Germany pays too much to 
the EU cash box. However, how Gerhard Schröder tries to capitalize on Bonn’s 
‘wasted EU-payments’ at home is alarming.”104 In retrospect, Schröder 
acknowledged that the anti-European polemic was inappropriate, and he regrets 
his first period of governance in European affairs.105 Apparently, Gerhard 
Schröder’s lack of experience in international politics initially constrained his view 
on the actual relevance of international relations and institutions as a whole. 
European crisis management in 1999, under the German Presidency of 
the European Council (including the Kosovo conflict, the further development of 
the ESDP, and the dissolution of the European Commission after a political 
scandal) was dominated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer, who 
successfully established his position as a decisive influence in Europe.106 As 
outlined above, Schröder found his power and personal style resurging after the 
resignation of his party-competitor, Oskar Lafontaine. In the context of European 
policy, the following example might demonstrate this thesis and underline typical 
patterns of his way to govern, which raised questions as to whether the new 
German government would actually stand for continuity.107 According to a 
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proposal for a new European Council Directive, all car-makers were obliged to 
redeem old cars without any fees. The directive had already been discussed on 
the secretary-level and was widely expected to be approved without any 
resistance. After consultations with representatives of the German car business, 
however, Gerhard Schröder personally stopped the directive and thereby abused 
his temporary position as President of the Council, against common practice. He 
formed a coalition of opposing European Union countries, and eventually 
succeeded in stopping the initiative. Schröder underlined, again, his ability to 
sense popular attitudes and his willingness to assert them. Polls by the European 
Union revealed an increasing skepticism of the German population regarding EU 
membership since the end of the 1990s, in general, and against concrete EU 
projects in particular.108   
C.  CONCLUSION 
George W. Bush’s staff assignments arguably constituted the decisive 
acts that would shape the future of international relations in the 21st century, 
since Bush was willing to delegate many decisions to his experts. His cabinet 
consisted of numerous people with extensive experience in former 
administrations. The assignments of Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Armitage 
made it possible for members of the conservative “Vulcans” group to shape U.S. 
foreign affairs. Even Condoleezza Rice, his National Security Advisor, was a 
leading member of this group, although her exact stance in terms of operational 
code and ideal of statecraft is difficult to determine across the breadth of her 
meteoric career. An exception in Bush’s staff was the Secretary of State, Colin 
Powell, who was convinced that George W. Bush would follow a multilateral-
oriented foreign policy, as his father had, according to his “compassionate 
conservatism” approach, which determined Bush’s campaign for office. At that 
time, one could  
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expect that either the conservative group in the White House and the Pentagon, 
or the more moderate Secretary of State, would convince the president and 
subsequently set the agenda of foreign policy.  
Gerhard Schröder was elected chancellor because of his large popularity 
in the center of the electoral spectrum. The backing of his party was still limited in 
comparison with the competitive SPD chairman, Oskar Lafontaine. As a 
consequence, Schröder had to continuously maintain his popularity in order to 
overcome the party’s programmatic pressure and the inter-coalition tensions. 
After the withdrawal of Lafontaine, he regained his pre-election power and the 
government’s policy increasingly carried his personal signature. In close 
company with Joschka Fischer, after several months of teething troubles in the 
area of foreign affairs, the German government gradually achieved its profile. 
The Kosovo conflict, especially, challenged the red-green coalition in an early 
period of the tenure. The new German government persisted in the acid test and 
demonstrated its international reliability. Schröder succeeded in demonstrating 
alliance loyalty by his personal commitments. In this context, it is noteworthy that 
Schröder, who had concentrated political power to the maximum extent possible 
in his own hands, was willing to let his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka 
Fischer, handle most of the decisions in this area of politics. His intervention 
against the proposed European Council directive, however, showed that foreign 
countries had to expect Schröder to make some ad hoc decisions contrary to 
common rules at times, especially when they would provide positive popular 
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IV.  EXAMPLES OF PREVIOUS TRANSATLANTIC 
RELATIONSHIPS  
On 31 January 2008, former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
addressed an open letter in the political weekly Die Zeit to the people of the 
United States of America, asking twelve questions about U.S. foreign policy and 
underlining its importance and relevance to Europe, in general, and to Germany 
in particular. U.S. foreign policy matters for Europe, Schmidt wrote, “In the course 
of the last century, we have learned that the foreign policy of each individual 
American president has had for us Europeans a nearly overwhelming 
importance.”109 By using the words “each president,” he stressed the impact of 
every single administration on international relations. 
In this chapter, key examples of the relationship between U.S. and 
German government leaders are reviewed to determine different approaches to 
enhancing the relationship between Germany and the United States. 
A.  JIMMY CARTER – HELMUT SCHMIDT 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the exceptionally close ties between West 
Germany and the United States in the 1950s had already loosened. This process 
began in 1961 with the changing of the guard from the Eisenhower 
Administration to that of John F. Kennedy. An aging chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
was unsettled by the new strategy of “flexible response,” and this was visible in 
the Berlin crisis of that year.  The difficulties of bi-lateral relations witnessed a 
further troublesome episode in 1966 amid the disagreements of Lyndon Baines 
Johnson and Ludwig Erhard over burden sharing in the era of the Vietnam War. 
The chief issue to be examined here soon followed this episode. One aspect of 
this policy divergence was the policy of détente from 1969 onwards, or the 
“Ostpolitik,” of Helmut Schmidt’s predecessor, Willy Brandt. At the same time, the 
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European threat assessment changed due to relaxed political conditions, such as 
the CSCE talks (1973-1975), and the need for a closing of the ranks between 
West Germany and the United States was gradually declining. The situation in 
the United States was characterized by scandals of the political elite, such as the 
Watergate scandal, conflicts between ethnic groups, and the weak global 
economy connected with the 1973 oil crisis. 
United States–West German relations seemed to be in excellent condition 
in 1976. A draft of a memorandum for Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, on the 
occasion of a ceremony on the bicentennial of U.S. independence in Frankfurt 
claimed: “The relations between the United States and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, in the last quarter century mostly close and cordial, has never been 
better than today.”110 At that time, the heads of government were Gerald Ford 
and Helmut Schmidt, who cultivated a transatlantic friendship and resolved rare 
arguments privately. After the election of the Democrat Jimmy (James) Earl 
Carter as President of the United States in November of the same year, the 
relationship started to change dramatically. 
Klaus Wiegriefe identified the following initial causes for the later tensions: 
there were completely different situations in the two countries (the American 
willingness to embrace change; the German preference for continuity): the lack of 
knowledge of one another complicated the mutual understanding (Carter’s 
interest in foreign affairs did not begin before his candidacy for president); 
Helmut Schmidt’s view of the United States was based on his observations of the 
Midwest and the northeastern states rather than the United States as a whole 
(including the South); and completely different views on the role of a political 
leader, characterized by differing types of political leadership (Carter focused his  
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campaign on his personal integrity, values, and faith in America’s mission, 
whereas Helmut Schmidt saw his position as chief executive of the country in a 
difficult period of change).111  
In addition to the structural problems already at an early stage, personal 
troubles arose. During the campaign for the presidency in 1976, Helmut Schmidt 
publicly supported the incumbent Gerald Ford (although he quickly sent a note of 
apology to Carter), and after the elections refused to congratulate Carter 
personally in accordance with common practice, but just sent a telegram. The 
German weekly magazine Der Spiegel analyzed this situation as follows: “That 
way the new era between the global power USA and its strongest ally in Europe 
starts with personal dissonances. The period of German-American partnership, 
which the chancellor praised as ‘the best relationship ever’ between Washington 
and Bonn, seems to draw to a close.”112  
Soon after inauguration, Carter changed the American stance on a 
number of crucial issues, such as the relationship to Russia, the stationing of 
neutron bombs in Germany, and the reaction to the dollar crash or the oil crisis, 
which affected the Federal Republic of Germany.  He also broke, to a large 
extent, with his predecessor’s political approach of consultations and 
negotiations.113 As a consequence, the already burdened relationship between 
Schmidt and Carter was additionally stressed on the political level. It was a 
question of diplomacy and bargaining to resolve the respective problems against 
the background of differing positions. The previous relationship between Schmidt 
and Ford had made it possible for the smaller ally to influence the decision-
making process of the United States and to assert German interests; the 
arrangement with the new president was much more difficult. The notion of the 
emerging middle power, West Germany, was completely different. “Washington 
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expected more support, Bonn more autonomy.”114 An example of this 
contradiction was Carter’s Locomotive Theory on how to spur the weak world 
economy. Carter urged West Germany to support this approach even prior to his 
official inauguration, but Chancellor Schmidt, a graduate in economics, rejected 
this “order” and asserted that West Germany would proceed with a more 
successful strategy. 
Besides structural differences, Klaus Wiegriefe also identified several 
personal issues that led to the discord between the United States and West 
Germany in the late 1970s. The West German politicians thought that they knew 
the United States, but this assumption was accurate only with respect to the 
center of political gravity in Washington and the Midwest and did not apply to the 
new president from the South and, as a consequence, their ignorance led to 
personal contention with Carter.  
Owing perhaps to an overreaching assertiveness, (the Financial Times 
had just named Schmidt “Man of the Year” in 1976)115 Schmidt criticized 
notoriously, and even publicly, his American counter-part in an unprecedented 
way. He tried to define his personal position in international politics as clearly 
distinct from that of Washington and instrumentalized the latent anti-Americanism 
that had evolved since the Vietnam War among German elites (not least among 
SPD members) and in other parts of Europe. This stance was inconsistent in that 
he pinned his hope on U.S. support in the context of the NATO Double-Track 
Decision (12 December 1979), and West German policy as a whole embraced a 
close transatlantic partnership. Schmidt himself said, “The most important factor 
contributing to stability is and remains the partnership between Europeans and 
Americans. This historic partnership remains a constant of our policy.”116  
                                            
114 Klaus Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis – Helmut Schmidt, Jimmy Carter und die Krise der 
deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen (Berlin: Prophyläen, 2005), 372. 
115 Ibid., 99. 
116 Helmut Schmidt, Perspectives on Politics (Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), 40. 
 59 
Helmut Schmidt actively extended West Germany’s autonomy in a kind of 
defensive nationalism, which implied to a certain extent its isolation within 
Western Europe. “In the image of the ‘Model Germany’ the entitlement to be a 
role model for the other European countries became manifest, not only by way of 
economic policy, but also in the policy of détente, which in Bonn’s self-conception 
was conducted ‘in the name of Europe’ (Timothy Garton Ash).”117 The principle 
of consultations between equal partners was an important theme of the bilateral 
relationship, from Schmidt’s perspective, and consistent with his view of the 
growing role of West Germany. He saw this principle breached by Carter and,  
hoping for changes after the presidential elections of 1980 appreciated his first 
meeting with newly elected President Ronald Reagan in May 1981. Schmidt 
stated, “It was therefore an encouragement to me that President Reagan, … and 
I were in complete agreement on the central role of early and close consultation 
among allies.”118 The American President summarized the same meeting in his 
diary as follows: “Meeting with Schmidt, regarded as a show of friendship.”119   
Helmut Schmidt continued to make publicly offensive comments about his 
American counterpart, probably because his expectations were not served to a 
sufficient extent. Klaus Larres summarized the shifts in U.S. foreign policy during 
the Reagan administration as follows, in a formulation that might have described 
exactly Helmut Schmidt’s perception: “Reagan’s election as President can ... be 
seen as a shift from benign neglect to arrogant neglect in America’s relations with 
its European allies.”120 In spite of his demonstration of sympathy with Carter’s 
successor with the words “I like this man,” he was quoted in Der Spiegel with the 
following statement, after he had hosted Ronald Reagan in 1982: “Meanwhile, 
Reagan appears to be like the Soviet [leader] … Leonid Brezhnev: Also the 
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American president merely recites those things that were written by his aides on 
slips of paper beforehand. You cannot discuss politics with Reagan in a 
reasonable way, [because] he [Reagan] often finds different opinions on his 
script, and then he recites those right off the bat.”121 Public statements of this 
kind and arguments about political issues, such as West-East trade, might have 
led to a rather tense relationship.  
B.  GEORGE H. W. BUSH – HELMUT KOHL 
Helmut Kohl, leader of the conservative Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU), came into power via a parliamentary vote of no confidence in 1982 and 
built a new governing coalition with the liberal party, the FDP. This coalition 
partner was previously in Helmut Schmidt’s government and provided the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs (Hans Dietrich Genscher). As a consequence, in West 
Germany’s international policies, continuity and experience were assured in the 
crises of the early 1980s and into the era of the end of the Cold War.  
Transatlantic relations improved after the election of Helmut Kohl in 1983, 
and the personal link between the leaders of government in the two countries 
had a significant improvement amid the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 
Crisis. After Kohl’s first visit, Ronald Reagan noted, “Our meeting was good. He 
is entirely different than his predecessor – very warm and outgoing. … We did hit 
it off and I believe we’ll have a fine relationship.”122 
In the course of time, even in the relationship between Kohl and Reagan, 
the Soviet Union’s predominating stance of vigilance in American policy was a 
cause of tensions, but there were no public recriminations. Unilateral American 
pressures constituted one of the factors that led to a closer relationship between 
Germany and its European neighbors, especially France. This led, eventually, to 
an integrated European market in 1992 and later to a European Union with a 
common currency.  
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Transatlantic relations changed in a sustained way with the presidency of 
George H.W. Bush in 1989-1993. The New York Times described the relevance 
of personal relations for the newly elected president as follows: “Friendship is Mr. 
Bush’s ideology, and personal diplomacy has driven his Presidency.”123 As the 
former Vice President of the United States, he was not a freshman in the field of 
international relations and became acquainted with most of the international 
decision-makers prior to his presidency, which ensured continuity in personal 
relations.  
Soon after his inauguration, the U.S. president realized that “further 
European integration, growing transatlantic interdependence, and German 
unification were inevitable. The Bush administration embarked on a course to 
respond to these developments and shape events.”124  
In this context, West Germany played a significant role, and this role 
reflected the good personal relationship between the two heads of government. 
In the spring of 1989, there were growing tensions about the course of action to 
take in light of the changes in the USSR, especially concerning the proposed 
modernization of short-range missiles in Europe. NATO was about to split in its 
common stance; the German chancellor favored negotiations with the USSR, but 
the United States preferred a firm position on dealing with Moscow. Instead of 
arguing this issue, George H.W. Bush decided to react in a cautious way and 
resisted pressure from Congress and the United Kingdom. Unlike his 
predecessor, the American president apparently shifted his political attention 
from the UK to the continent, a step that reflected the evolving political and 
economic power of the latter. On 1 June 1989, Bush publicly stated the new 
relevance of West Germany and its chancellor, Helmut Kohl. “The United States 
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and the Federal Republic have always been firm friends and allies, … but today 
we share an added role as partners in leadership.”125  
The close and trusting relationship of the two heads of government 
became evident in the vast consultations in the context of the re-unification of 
Germany in the era 1989-1991. In the course of the demise of the Soviet 
superpower, George H.W. Bush trusted to the political evaluation of his German 
counterpart regarding the expected reactions of Mikhail Gorbachev. He even 
took advice from Helmut Kohl, who always stressed the high relevance of the 
transatlantic relationship throughout the whole process of the years 1989 and 
1990 and discussed each important step with the American president.  
This high level of information sharing enabled George H.W. Bush to resist 
domestic pressure and stick to personal agreements. In one of the numerous 
telephone calls with the German chancellor in the context of an upcoming re-
unification process, the American president assured him, “In spite of 
Congressional posturing, the U.S. will stay calm and support reforms. The 
euphoric excitement in the U.S. runs the risk of unforeseen action in the USSR or 
East Germany. We will not exacerbate the problem by having the President of 
the United States posturing on the Berlin Wall.”126 As a consequence of the close 
links between George H.W. Bush and Helmut Kohl, a new special German-
American relationship was evolving. “If there is indeed going to be a new ‘special 
relationship’, … it is being designed and run by and for insiders in much the 
same way as the ‘special relationship’ the United States had (until yesterday) 
with Great Britain.”127 
The close ties between Germany and the United States were not limited to 
the re-unification process, but survived its aftermath and shaped ongoing day-to-
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day decisions, especially regarding the future of Eastern Europe. This became 
apparent, for instance, in a conference lasting several days, which was 
conducted in an informal way in March 1992. Besides the content of the talks, 
Helmut Kohl underlined the importance of the bi-lateral relationship in a 
subsequent press conference: “It became apparent that the United States of 
America and reunified Germany are linked by very strong bonds of friendship and 
partnership. No matter what will happen in the world, this friendship, this 
partnership is of existential importance for us Germans.”128 
Throughout his service as chancellor, Helmut Kohl always acted as a 
convinced Atlanticist. His steady commitment to the transatlantic alliance during 
the re-unification negotiations underlined this strict stance. When the de facto 
absence as an active ally in the Gulf War in 1991, which united numerous allies 
in a successful multinational operation, raised questions about Germany’s 
reliability, Helmut Kohl publicly demonstrated his support for the tough line of the 
United States against Saddam Hussein, and that the good transatlantic 
relationship could not be damaged.  
C.  BILL CLINTON – HELMUT KOHL 
The importance of the transatlantic relationship for Helmut Kohl continued 
to shape German-U.S. relations during the presidency of Bill Clinton, which 
began in January 1993. However, during Clinton’s tenure the transatlantic 
alliance faced several crises. “The two sides of the Atlantic were soon at odds 
over Bosnia, where the U.S.’s emerging ‘lift-and-strike’ policy differed 
dramatically from Europe’s reluctance to take sides in ex-Yugoslavia’s civil wars. 
No sooner had the allies recovered at Dayton [in 1995] than the Kosovo conflict 
again threatened unity.”129 
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Despite controversial positions on the use of force, due to Helmut Kohl’s 
historical caution regarding the deployment of German soldiers, the excellent 
relationship was estimated to be more important than disputes on political issues. 
An example of this pro-American stance was the upcoming conflict with Iraq in 
1998. In spite of the fact that Helmut Kohl was not consulted prior to the annual 
European security conference, in Munich, about the fact that the issue of support 
in the event of an Iraq War would be discussed, he did not react in an offended 
way, but spontaneously offered more commitments of the German military in the 
former Yugoslavia.130  
Even when Bill Clinton was preoccupied with a romantic affair and the 
subsequent public prosecution reduced the credibility of the American head of 
state, the conservative Helmut Kohl reacted only in terms of concerns about the 
weakened status of the United States and hence the transatlantic alliance. He 
publicly backed the position of Bill Clinton as far as possible and hoped for an 
ending of this situation as soon as possible.131  
In the final phase of the German election in 1998, Bill Clinton publicly 
supported the position of his close German partner, as he did before with 
Russia’s president, Boris Yeltsin, and Mexico’s president, Ernesto Zedillo. Clinton 
not only appreciated Kohl’s diplomatic capability, but even stated on the occasion 
of his visit to Germany, “This magic moment in history [Germany’s re-unification] 
did not simply arrive, … It was made, and made largely by the vision and 
determined leadership of Germany and its chancellor for nine years. … Though 
many German citizens may be uncertain of the courageous course, you are 
clearly on the right side of history.”132 Soon after this statement, the White House 
Press Secretary conceded that there was no intention to influence the elections 
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and that the president met the challenger, Gerhard Schröder, on the same 
occasion. However, according to the Washington Post, Bill Clinton insisted on 
expressing a personal sense of his admiration for Kohl in his speech against the 
advice of White House aides to avoid a partisan tone.133 This kind of public 
partisanship of a leader of the United States or Germany had only been observed 
two decades before, with Helmut Schmidt and Gerald Ford in 1976.  
Helmut Kohl was the last German chancellor who grew up under the direct 
influence of World War II and its aftermath, and this influenced his strong 
willingness to maintain close relations with the United States. In addition to 
political changes in the security environment in Europe, personal experiences 
differing from Kohl’s might influence future German-American relations. Robert 
G. Livingston regarded such changes as inevitable: “Kohl has infused the 
bilateral relationship with nostalgic sentimentality. His replacement by a leader 
from a younger generation will inevitably attenuate the connection.”134 
D.  CONCLUSION 
The comparison of various personal relationships between U.S. and 
German leaders demonstrates that the discord between George W. Bush and 
Gerhard Schröder was not the first to arise within the last five decades. The 
historical evidence does not support an assumption that the American 
conservatives, the Republicans, and the conservative Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) on the one hand, and the American Democrats and the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) in Germany on the other hand, would cooperate better, 
since they might share more common values. The left-of-center chancellor, 
Helmut Schmidt, got along much better with the conservative president, Gerald 
Ford, than with his democratic successor, Jimmy Carter. This observation also 
applies to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who shared a kind of friendship with the 
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conservative president, George H.W. Bush, but cooperated on a professional 
level with his conservative predecessor, Ronald Reagan. 
In all of the above investigated relationships between American and 
German heads of government, personal factors mattered and had an impact on 
the political level. One of the most significant factors for close transatlantic 
relations was the element of consultation. In contrast, periods of a predominant 
role for the United States seem to be rather counterproductive. American 
pressure on Germany’s foreign policies resulted either in publicly stated criticism 
(Helmut Schmidt on Jimmy Carter) combined with a Europe-focused orientation 
of the foreign policy, or indirectly expressed disagreement by concentrating on 
shaping the European Community (Helmut Kohl and Ronald Reagan). The 
closest ties between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany 
could be seen in periods of “partners in leadership” that recognized the rising 
détente between West and East, the enhanced autonomy of Germany, and 
Germany’s strong political and economic role in Europe. Helmut Schmidt and 
Helmut Kohl insisted on sharing not only the burdens of the transatlantic alliance, 
but also the responsibilities, while asserting national interests.135 In these times 
of cordial links between the two countries, American presidents had to face rising 
domestic pressure to increase U.S. predominance.  
Questions about the reliability of reunited Germany and its economic 
struggle in the aftermath of re-unification challenged Germany’s central position 
in the 1990s. However, the decision of the German Constitutional Supreme Court 
in 1994, authorizing German out-of-area operations approved by Parliament, and 
the commitments in the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts, proved Germany’s ability 
and willingness to fulfill its international obligations. 
NATO survived the aftermath of the Cold War and was the unifying 
framework for the transatlantic relationship between the United States and 
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Germany until the discord of 2002. In contrast with the German government, the 
George W. Bush administration did not seem to feel obliged to NATO in the 
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V.  THE DISCORD OF THE IRAQ WAR  
A.  TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP AND THE IMPACT OF 9/11 
When George W. Bush took the oath of office on 20 January 2001, his 
German counterpart, Gerhard Schröder, had already experienced more than two 
years in office and could finally establish his personal line on foreign policy, in 
company with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer, after tremendous 
initial problems. During the first year, the German government had proved in a 
difficult external environment, especially the crisis over the Kosovo War, that re-
united Germany was a reliable partner within the international framework, 
emphasizing alliance loyalty and the importance of the transatlantic relationship. 
The transatlantic relations in 1998-2000 could be described as neutral; 
they were not filled with tensions and did not reach an exceptionally amicable 
level. Gerhard Schröder’s contacts with American representatives were strongly 
focused on Washington’s governmental area and Midwest entrepreneurs. 
Schröder’s initial situation in January 2001, when George W. Bush took office, 
bears a striking similarity to that of Helmut Schmidt, who also had exclusive 
contact with Northeastern Americans, and admitted that a probable reason for 
later discords had their origins in the fact that he had no actual understanding of 
the new president, Jimmy Carter, who came from the South with different values 
and visions. George W. Bush campaigned in 2000 with a focus on visions, 
morality and integrity, as Carter had in 1976. Bush wished to draw a contrast with 
what he perceived as a lack of values in the Clinton White House. Schröder was 
critical of a type of political control that raises a claim for a “spiritual-moral 
leadership“ and that expands political competences into society. 
The U.S. president revealed soon after his inauguration the stance of his 
administration regarding the position of the United States within the global 
framework of international relations. George W. Bush’s first decisions, in early 
2001, affecting the international community, were in diametric conflict with the 
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German multilateral and institutional approach embracing norms. “In seeking a 
balance of power favouring freedom, …, in rejecting the Kyoto Protocol, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and other arms control and human rights 
conventions, Bush and his advisors display a fundamental disdain for the norms, 
institutions and rules that bind the community in whose interests they are 
ostensibly acting.”136  
1.  Denial of the Kyoto Protocol – Much More Than a Domestic 
Decision 
The ignorance of international relations with regard to the German 
government was especially evident in Bush’s decision to reject the Kyoto 
Protocol, an international agreement to cut emissions of greenhouse gases.  He 
did this without any promise of future negotiations or previous consultations with 
the closest allies, on the eve of Schröder’s first visit to the White House on 29 
March 2001, and against the background of the upcoming conference on the 
global climate in Germany in July 2001. The Kyoto Protocol had a decisive 
meaning for Schröder, since he relied on his partner within a weak coalition, the 
Greens. To underline the importance of this issue, Schröder had sent a personal 
letter to the U.S. president on 19 March 2001, ten days in advance.137  
It is noteworthy that Bush’s decision was not without resistance in the 
administration. The Secretary of State, Colin Powell, basically agreed with the 
president’s decision, but at the same time, he was afraid of the international 
implications. Hence, he strongly suggested emphasizing further international 
commitments on a mutual solution by inserting an additional statement in the 
decision paper as follows: “And we’re going to work with our friends and allies to 
see how we can move forward together on emissions. And then we’re going to 
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have to go talk to our friends and allies about this before we do it.”138 Instead, 
Bush held a meeting on the Kyoto protocol issue without his Secretary of State 
and decided to reject it, disregarding the possible international tensions. “News of 
the letter [on the Kyoto protocol], followed by a statement from Rice to EU 
ambassadors that Kyoto was ‘dead,’ drove the first of what would be many 
wedges between the Bush administration and traditional U.S. allies in Europe.”139 
The decision-making process in the White House, in the case of the Kyoto 
Protocol, demonstrated at the very beginning of the Bush administration not only 
the unilateral approach in foreign affairs, but also the isolated role of Powell 
within the administration. In retrospect, Schröder judged the Kyoto Protocol issue 
as one of two fundamental decisions that contributed to the loss in confidence of 
the United States around the world.140 
Der Spiegel summarized in 2001 the Bush-Schröder relationship, which 
was limited to only a few phone calls and official meetings until September 2001, 
as a “professional non-relationship.”141 However, the affront during Schröder’s 
visit to Washington and the rare exchange between the two heads of government 
did not cause any public complaints from the German side. 
2.  The Attacks of 9/11 – German Alliance 
On 11 September 2001, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington 
changed the world in numerous ways. With regard to the U.S.-German 
relationship, one might assume that the immediate aftermath of 9/11 “was to be 
the high point of German cooperation with the George W. Bush 
administration.”142  
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When the breaking news of the attack was sent around the world, Gerhard 
Schröder was in his chancellery preparing his speech for the annual budget 
debate and the visit of the Hungarian Prime Minister was set on his agenda. 
Schröder recalled that his first reaction had been, “My first reactions were 
powerlessness followed by anger at the perpetrators. … At that moment I did not 
reflect on the more profound, political implications.”143 Shortly afterwards, he 
assembled a crisis reaction team in the chancellery in Berlin with the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer, the Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily, and the 
Minister of Defense, Rudolph Scharping. At that time, within two hours after the 
attacks, he established the political line of “unlimited solidarity” with the United 
States, which he based on his first overwhelming impression. This important 
decision was his personal one, and it had already been made prior to further 
consultations with the Federal Security Council, the cabinet, the coalition, and the 
opposition. At the time, Schröder was well aware that the U.S. reaction would 
probably include military means. Such an option notwithstanding, he sent a 
telegram to George W. Bush, in which he affirmed Germany’s unlimited 
solidarity.144 Following his typical pattern, Schröder had already created facts 
regarding unlimited support for the United States; the subsequent consultation 
would only specify the practical means of support, but not whether Germany 
would support the United States. In the evening of the next day, Gerhard 
Schröder personally guaranteed George W. Bush that Germany would contribute 
to the U.S. counteraction without any reservation.145 In response to the support 
offered by numerous countries, the American president declared in his address 
to the nation on 11 September 2001, “And on behalf of the American people, I 
thank the many world leaders who have called to offer their condolences and 
assistance. America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace 
and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against 
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terrorism.”146 The unanimously supported UN SCR 1368 on 12 September 2001 
was the legal foundation for the use of force against the Taliban regime, in 
Afghanistan, as an act of self-defense. 
On 19 September 2001, Gerhard Schröder defined his understanding of 
“unconditional solidarity” in a speech in the German parliament, but added a 
vague limitation in terms of avoiding “adventures”:  
In view of these unprecedented attacks, Germany stands at the 
side of the United States of America. Our commitment to the 
political and moral solidarity with the USA now is more than self-
evident. … Linked to the duty of the alliance [Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty], to which we adhere, there also corresponds a right; 
and this right is called that of information and consultation. We, as 
Germans and Europeans, want to attain unconditional solidarity 
with the USA in all necessary measures. I emphasize: Germany is 
ready to take risks – in terms of the military, as well -, but not [to 
participate] in adventures. The latter is not asked of us, thanks to 
the sober-minded position of the American administration.147  
Besides their deep sympathy with the American people, Gerhard Schröder 
and Joschka Fischer wanted to assure the United States of Germany’s alliance  
loyalty in this crucial situation, right from the very beginning, since they had 
already witnessed a strong resistance within the red-green governing coalition in 
the Kosovo conflict only one and a half years before. Additionally, for Schröder, 
Germany’s new role as an actor in the post-9/11 environment was, even more 
than before, a personal concern, which explains his extensive commitments in 
parliament in this case. After the beginning of the U.S.-led campaign in 
Afghanistan on 11 October 2001, he underlined the legitimacy of the military 
operation and stressed the relevance of re-united Germany on the international 
stage. “Only ten years ago, nobody would have expected us to contribute in 
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international commitments for security and freedom, justice and stability by 
anything other than ‘secondary support’. … I thoroughly state this with regard to 
my own thinking and action. This period of German post-war politics – I claimed 
this just after September 11 – is irretrievably gone.”148  
The red-green coalition was far from united as far as demonstrating 
“unconditional solidarity” in support of the use of military force as a reaction to the 
attacks of 9/11. Dissent was expressed by eight representatives of the Green 
faction in the German Parliament, who asserted in public opposition to the 
political line of the chancellor, “In conclusion: The war against Afghanistan is 
politically wrong, does not serve the goals of combat against terrorism, is lacking 
humanitarian responsibility and shall bring new political problems. It is a 
misadventure, in which no one, including the Federal Republic, should 
participate.”149 The relevance of this initiative derived from the numerous critics 
of Schröder’s policy within the government and the fact that this opposition 
mirrored the changes in attitude of a large number of the German population.  
Immediately after 9/11 “200,000 Germans gathered spontaneously at the 
Brandenburg Gate for a pro-American rally”150 and 80 percent of the Germans 
agreed to U.S. air raids in Afghanistan in early October 2001. However, the 
approval rate dropped down to around 50 percent when the decision on 
participation by the German armed forces was due in November 2001.151   
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In the context of the parliament’s decision on the actual participation of the 
German military in Afghanistan on 16 November 2001, Gerhard Schröder had to 
exert pressure on his coalition by linking it with a vote of confidence according to 
article 68, paragraph 1 of the German Constitution.152 He was willing to put the 
government, his career, and his political reputation at stake to align the 
discordant coalition and thereby achieve acceptance of his personal conviction. 
Schröder’s assessment at that time was “that the United States responded in the 
only rational way to the psychic shock which they suffered from the wound of 
‘Ground Zero’, by the formation of a worldwide coalition against terrorism.”153 
This implied a multilateral approach by the Bush administration with Germany as 
a reliable ally. As claimed in his statement for the government on 19 September 
2001, he was convinced that by providing support, Germany would be consulted 
and “get a voice in further military operations in the Middle East. According to the 
motto of smart practitioners of power politics ‘If you can’t beat them, join 
them.’”154 The vote in the German Parliament was marginally in favor of the 
contribution in Afghanistan. The resolution of the parliament on 16 November 
2001 stated, “The German Armed Forces will participate in possible operations 
against international terrorism in foreign countries (other than Afghanistan) only 
with the agreement of the respective government.”155 In effect, Gerhard Schröder 
could only obtain a limited mandate for future operations after Afghanistan, which 
meant that the German position of “unlimited solidarity” was actually very limited. 
He certainly would have obtained a much stronger mandate if he had not linked 
the vote for the mission in Afghanistan with a vote of confidence, since he could 
count on conservative support on this issue, but he had definitely risked the 
governing coalition.  
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In late September 2001, the former chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, who 
personally experienced the troubles caused by inadequate consultations 
(Chapter IV.3), underlined the importance of consultations between the United 
States and its allies as the guarantor of success in the war against terrorism. 
“The American administration and Congress can count on the will of solidarity of 
Europe and Germany. It could only be compromised, if Washington lacked 
information and consultation or might not react accordingly.”156 The relationship 
between Germany and the United States was still close in the first months after 
the start of the war in Afghanistan, during Operation Enduring Freedom. Gerhard 
Schröder did not see any sign of a hidden agenda in the war against terrorism. 
“At the end of the year, it seemed to be clear that even for the USA, it was a 
matter of calling perpetrators to account, who acknowledged themselves as the 
perpetrators on video- and audio tapes of the terrorist attacks in New York and 
the Pentagon.”157 
3.  The Attacks of 9/11 – Impacts on American Foreign Policy 
When the first plane crashed into the World Trade Center on 11 
September 2001, George W. Bush was reading to a class at an elementary 
school in Florida. Although George W. Bush insisted on returning to Washington 
D.C. as soon as possible, he did not arrive before the evening of the same day in 
the U.S. capital, since it was assumed that the president might be another target 
of the terrorists. After he had returned to the Oval Office, George W. Bush 
addressed the nation with his first official speech after the terrorist attacks. This 
speech was hastily drafted in the chaotic conditions of that day and only revised 
by his perennial advisor, Karen Hughes, and it can be assumed that the chosen 
words would mirror Bush’s personal attitude more than later ones. David Frum, 
one of his regular speechwriters, confirmed this assumption by derogatively 
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stating that, “the speech Bush had delivered was not a war speech. It was a 
hastily revised compassionate conservatism speech.”158 Although Bush stated, 
“we stand together to win the war against terrorism,”159 he avoided promising 
retaliation against the attackers and overall used moderate and compassionate 
words. The international reaction was one of broad approval to the sober-minded 
president, but it was unclear whether the American population would judge it the 
same way. The president’s rhetoric would change dramatically in the course of 
the next months. 
In the absence of Bush from Washington, Vice President Dick Cheney, 
who was still familiar with the catastrophe procedures of the Cold War, managed 
the crisis of the threat against the White House as did Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld in the Pentagon, which was itself a scene of battle and 
carnage. The decision to assign the crisis management responsibility to these 
two veterans from a former cabinet seemed to be the right decision to George W. 
Bush.  On his flight back to Washington, the president had decided that a military 
reaction to the attacks was due, and stated in a phone call to his Secretary of 
Defense: “It’s a day of national tragedy, and we’ll clean up the mess and then the 
ball will be in your and Dick Meyers’s [designated chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff] court.”160 Bush later recalled two thoughts; first, “This was a war in which 
people were going to have to die. Secondly, I was not a military tactician. I 
recognize that. I was going to have to rely on the advice and counsel of 
Rumsfeld, Shelton, Myers and Tenet.”161  
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For the same evening, a meeting of an expanded National Security 
Council (NSC) was scheduled with the aim of discussing the objective of the U.S. 
military response to the terrorist attacks. Since the Secretary of State was still on 
his flight back from Peru, Powell was not involved in the far-reaching foreign 
policy decision “to punish whoever harbors terrorists, not just the 
perpetrators.”162 In a subsequent gathering of the war cabinet, still on 11 
September, Afghanistan was identified as the first out of numerous countries that 
were assumed to harbor the terrorists of the Al Qaeda group, which was found 
responsible for the 9/11 attacks.163  
On 14 September 2001, George W. Bush visited New York City. Here, in 
the center of the catastrophe, he was overwhelmed by the impression he got 
from the patriotic Americans chanting, “USA! USA!” The Mayor of New York City, 
Rudolph Giuliani, who accompanied Bush, pointed at the shouting crowd. “’You 
see those people cheering you?’ he asked Bush. ‘Not one of them voted for 
you.’”164 Giuliani’s statement may not have been entirely correct. However, he 
made a valid point; at this moment, the people addressed all their hopes to the 
president and demonstrated that the American people were united. Charles E. 
Cook, Jr. stated that, “the Bush administration seemed to be adrift until the 
tragedies of September 11. A wave of patriotism and national unity, along with 
the president’s greatly improved performances … propelled his job approval 
ratings as high as 91 percent.”165 If George W. Bush had not known previously 
what his presidency would stand for, in the wake of 9/11 he found his personal 
mission: He told his advisor, Karl Rove, “I’m here for a reason, … and this is 
going to be how we’re going to be judged.”166 This assumption is consistent with 
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his character (Chapter II.1) and his disposition to follow superior visions and 
objectives and might have been the reason for his future personal commitment in 
the war on terror and in foreign affairs. Stephen Szabo concluded that later 
reversals had disproportionate affects on him, “because of George W. Bush’s 
highly personalized approach to foreign policy.”167  
One week later, on 20 September 2001, Bush declared in his address to a 
Joint Session of Congress and the American people that the United States had a 
duty to wage a war against Islamic terrorists, but stressed that terrorism was not 
directly linked to a religion. “The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in 
effect, to hijack Islam itself.  The enemy of America is not our many Muslim 
friends; it is not our many Arab friends.  Our enemy is a radical network of 
terrorists, and every government that supports them.”168 His choice of words was 
still moderate and one might see his personal, compassionate handwriting. In the 
aftermath of his speech, his approval rating climbed to its highest levels. The task 
of organizing a multinational coalition against terrorism, including rather 
problematic countries such as Pakistan, determined Colin Powell’s agenda in the 
succeeding days. 
The war in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom), was started on 7 
October 2001 – only 26 days after the terrorist attacks – and soon brought the 
first military success. George W. Bush, who found his vocation in the war on 
terrorism, performed in a way that was not expected. After his inauguration, 
many critics saw Bush as a “stupid cowboy” from Texas. In December 2001, this 
view turned into admiration for some former critics. For instance, the British 
magazine The Economist offered a positive interim statement on the successes 
of Bush in the time after 9/11: “Barely three months after September 11th, Mr 
Bush has masterminded a stunning victory (fingers crossed) in a country that 
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was once known as the graveyard of empires. Al-Qaeda is in retreat. And the 
world's leaders, even that Pakistani guy he once found he couldn't name [note: 
when Bush was questioned by a reporter during his campaign in 2000], are 
competing to be George W.'s best friend.”169 Despite the fact that George W. 
Bush used a multinational approach in Afghanistan, the course of action 
indicated that the allies played only a minor role. “The European governments’ 
only objection to the American military campaign in Afghanistan was that they 
were allowed only in a minor role in it.”170 Since Operation Enduring Freedom 
was the first strike directly related to 9/11, and due to the experience of the 
Kosovo War, which demonstrated the military weakness of Europe, the European 
critics of the coalition approach adopted by the United States – which the critics 
incorrectly called a “unilateral” approach – kept silent in this early stage of the 
fight against terrorism, but they would raise their voices later.  
B.  THE COURSE OF EVENTS 2002 – SCHRÖDER’S DENIAL OF 
SUPPORT 
The moderate rhetoric of the Bush administration in early 2002, regarding 
the war against terrorism, changed to a much stronger type, and the objective 
became more ambitious. Already in late December 2001, the speechwriter David 
Frum was asked to “sum up in a sentence or two our [U.S.] best case for going 
after Iraq.”171 The result was the phrase “axis of evil.”  
In his State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002, George W. Bush 
made clear that the “war on terror” in Afghanistan was just the beginning, and 
named Iraq, Iran and North Korea as future objectives in this war for the first 
time. “States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming 
to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, 
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these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. … In any of these cases, the 
price of indifference would be catastrophic.”172 The last sentence at least gave a 
hint that the Bush administration was moving toward a preventive-minded 
strategic approach. In the same speech Bush said, “We’ll be deliberate, yet time 
is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand 
by, as peril draws closer and closer.”173  
Only two days later, Gerhard Schröder flew to Washington for a meeting 
with George W. Bush and recalled later that he had some discomfort with the 
visit, since he and his colleagues expected a new dimension in the U.S. fight 
against terrorism, in view of the “almost biblical wording” used by the American 
president.174 Although Bush assured Schröder that no decision on Iraq had been 
made, Schröder stated that a German contribution would depend on the same 
restrictions as in the case of Afghanistan. That is, Germany would participate in a 
military engagement only with approval by the UNSC.175 From Schröder’s 
perspective, the Bush administration was on the way back to the unilateral policy 
that characterized the first months in 2001. Additionally, Bush’s choice of words – 
e.g. “evil” – was like Ronald Reagan’s, an attitude Schröder rejected (Chapter 
II.3). The personal relationship between the two heads of government cooled in 
the first quarter of 2002. In fact, the new policy of the United States increasingly 
challenged Schröder’s position in Germany, which was problematic anyway. 
1.  The Shift in U.S. Security Policy  
It soon turned out that Iraq could become the next step in the war against 
terrorism. Iraq had been an intermittently occurring topic within the NSC in the 
White House since the inauguration of the administration. Secretary of Defense 
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Donald Rumsfeld first brought up the issue of Iraq in the constituent assembly of 
the NSC in January 2001.176 In this meeting, Colin Powell noticed after he 
reported on the situation of the Palestinian-Israeli relationship that, “The 
discussion moved on, and it quickly became apparent that powerful voices 
around the table were far more interested in Iraq than in the bogged-down 
Mideast peace process.”177  
On 5 February 2001, the NSC gathered again, and instead of supporting 
Powell’s approach to re-shape the sanctions against Iraq, the president 
eventually approved a proposal by Rumsfeld to loosen the rules of engagement 
for aircraft pilots, even outside the no-fly zones in Iraq, which meant that “The 
United States would no longer feel constrained about using its military on the 
ground of Iraq.”178 The subsequent U.S.-British air strikes against targets in Iraq 
outside the already controversial no-fly zones on 16 February 2001 were a quick 
implementation of the new guidelines and demonstrated, at an early stage, the 
close collaboration of the United States and the United Kingdom on the issue of 
Iraq. Among others, the British newspaper The Guardian, excoriated the support 
of Prime Minister Tony Blair for Bush’s policy.179  From George W. Bush’s 
perspective, this incident revealed the consequences that flow from decisions 
based on the recommendations of his NSC advisors.   
When President Bush actually made his final decision to attack Iraq in the 
context of the “war on terror” is not conclusively clear. Paul Wolfowitz suggested 
already in September 2001, in the damaged Pentagon, on the occasion of an 
informal visit from Joschka Fischer, that Saddam Hussein was the second 
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objective after the Taliban.180 According to Bob Woodward, George W. Bush 
ordered Rumsfeld to start updating the already ongoing war plan for Iraq on 21 
November 2001, which indicates that Iraq was evaluated, in all likelihood, as a 
future target.181 Probably, the post-9/11 anthrax attacks in the United States 
spurred the perceived need to act even more decisively. Whether Iraq had 
already become a priority target for Bush at that time or might become one of 
secondary importance, a shift in U.S. foreign policy definitely became apparent. 
“The neoconservative policy shift after 9/11 transformed the United States from 
being the guarantor of the status quo, … into a revolutionary power and 
supplanted the USA’s collaborative Cold War leadership with a more muscular, 
unilateral, and crusading exercise of hegemony.”182 
The focus on Iraq, in the context of the “axis of evil” in the State of the 
Union Address, was made apparent by the president, personally. The Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, publicly stated how the United States 
intended to conduct future operations at the “Munich Conference on Security 
Policy” on 2 February 2002. At least two elements of this speech caused broad 
skepticism among European participants. Schröder called it “the second phase of 
the war on terror.”183 First, Wolfowitz stressed the shift in U.S. security policy to 
preventive self-defense, which was controversial in international law. “As 
Secretary Rumsfeld said recently, self-defense ‘requires prevention and 
sometimes preemption.’ It is not possible to defend against ‘every threat, in every 
place, at every conceivable time.’ The only defense against terrorism is to ‘take 
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the war to the enemy.’”184 Secondly, the NATO allies, in the fight against 
terrorism, were implicitly marginalized when Wolfowitz repeated one of 
Rumsfeld’s observations. Wolfowitz said, “One of the most important concepts 
concerns the nature of coalitions in this campaign and the idea that ‘the mission 
must determine the coalition, the coalition must not determine the mission.’ 
Otherwise … the mission will be reduced to "the lowest common 
denominator."185 Since the Secretary of Defense had previously made the same 
statements and there was no objection from George W. Bush, the new strategy 
apparently was in line with views at the White House. However, one might ask 
why the Pentagon had such a superior influence in shaping U.S. foreign policy. 
The successes of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan gave Bush 
confidence that the United States could wage the war alone, although he 
preferred to have an international coalition, and he enjoyed building one for the 
war in Afghanistan.186 The U.S. approach to the fight against terrorism seemed 
to have tremendously changed in the first weeks of 2002, and this was not the 
result of a multinational consensus, but of a unilateral decision. In February 2002, 
any plan to make Iraq a main objective of U.S. action was still linked to the “war 
on terror.” 
2.  The Calm before The Storm 
On 22 and 23 May 2002, George W. Bush’s visit to Germany was 
scheduled. In his memoirs, Schröder noted with regard to this visit, “It was 
tangible, how much the sympathy for this president had changed in the 
population, too.”187 Schröder’s choice of words suggests that by May 2002, the 
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relationship, from Schröder’s perspective, was determined by disapproval of 
Bush’s policies. Stephen Szabo estimated that “This visit later turned out to be 
one of the pivotal events in the unraveling of the Bush-Schröder relationship.”188 
The visit went more smoothly than expected. At a special session of the 
German Parliament, Bush returned to moderate words and expressed support for 
a multilateral approach in facing the threats of terrorism, although he again used 
the phrase “axis of evil.” “Our response will be reasoned, and focused, and 
deliberate. We will use more than our military might. … America will consult 
closely with our friends and allies at every stage. But make no mistake about it, 
we will and we must confront this conspiracy against our liberty and against our 
lives.”189 In the press conference prior to the session in parliament, both George 
W. Bush and Gerhard Schröder expressed their agreements on current issues 
(“there is a tremendous amount of agreement between the two of us”) and 
underlined that, with regard to an upcoming war in Iraq, no decision had been 
made. Schröder additionally stressed the peaceful approach: “And we're very 
much agreed that we have to do whatever we can to bring a peaceful solution to 
this conflict [the entire Middle East]. I mean, we must make sure that no further 
escalation happens over there,” but he also “emphasized very strongly that the 
President's speech in Washington was a milestone regarding this situation.”190 If 
he were referring to the Address to the Nation in February 2002, he would have 
contradicted his critical assessment on Bush at least partially. Based on 
information that is not available to the thesis author, Stephen Szabo stated that in 
the context of Bush’s visit to Berlin, “There was an implicit agreement that neither 
of them would make war with Iraq an issue before the German election, which 
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was coming up in September.”191 It can be taken for granted that the German 
chancellor did not confront the American president, who called Schröder a friend 
during his visit, with a German “no” on a war against Iraq on the last personal 
occasion prior to the election. Schröder described good personal relations 
between himself and other political leaders as “helpful” but not necessary for 
successful politics.192 Overall, he was comfortable with the visit of Bush in May 
2002. On the personal level, however, reservations prevailed.  
Despite the relaxed atmosphere, there was something that 
bothered me and aroused my suspicion: Again and again, even in 
our talks in confidence, it could be heard to which extent this 
president understood himself as ‘god-fearing’ and in line with his 
higher powers. … The problem I have with this kind of position 
starts where one cannot help but think that political decisions are a 
result of prayers. … The claim of the absolute that I met over and 
over again in the year 2002, not only in conversations with the 
American president, but also in his public statements, raised my 
political skepticism.193 
At the time of President Bush’s visit to Germany in May 2002, Schröder 
entered the final phase of his re-election campaign, which would end with the 
national elections in October 2002. Hence, it can be assumed that his statements 
and decisions, both domestically and internationally, were at least indirectly 
linked to that precious date.194 The approval rate for the governing coalition in 
June 2002, just after Bush’s departure, increased from 5 percent to 48 percent 
and was ahead of the challenging liberal-conservative parties by 6 percent. The 
approval rate for the chancellor climbed strongly, by 8 percent, up to 56 percent. 
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However, if Germany had to vote in June 2002, the majority would have 
preferred the CDU as the strongest party in parliament, whereas more than a 
third of the electorate stated that they had not finally decided which party to vote 
for in October. The polls underlined that the chancellor still was the SPD’s strong 
personality in the popular perception. This would not change until Election Day, 
but his party could not always benefit sufficiently from his popularity. After a 
downturn in July, however, the polls predicted a marginal surplus for the red-
green coalition in August 2002. 
3.  The Confrontation of Different Stances 
Soon after returning from his journey to Europe, President Bush delivered 
a graduation speech at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and publicly 
noted for the first time that he was about to shift American policy toward a rather 
idealistic “mission” in terms of shaping the globe, instead of solely fighting global 
terrorism.  “We have our best chance since the rise of the nation state in the 17th 
century to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of 
prepare for war. … America stands for more than the absence of war. We have a 
great opportunity to extend a just peace, by replacing poverty, repression, and 
resentment around the world with hope of a better day.”195 The shift in U.S. 
policy might have been caused by Bush’s awareness that the unity of the 
coalition in the fight against terrorism was gradually disintegrating and that the 
allies were attaching restrictions to their support, as stated by Gerhard 
Schröder.196 It certainly was not only the fragmenting international coalition that 
drove him, but also the vanishing domestic support, which was required to get 
the approval of Congress for further operations.  
From Bush’s perspective, resistance to his policy would weaken his 
position; on the other hand, Gerhard Schröder had to take popular resistance to 
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Bush’s policy line into account. “Both Schröder and Fischer had already sensed 
great uneasiness among crowds at campaign rallies about both the prospect of 
war and the perceived recklessness of Bush, and the audiences they addressed 
applauded any assurances that they would not be pulled into a war in Iraq.”197 In 
July 2002, Gerhard Schröder brought himself to oppose a war in Iraq. He stated 
the reasons for his decision publicly in a session of the Executive Committee of 
his party on 1 August 2002.198 He personally became more and more critical of a 
possible war against Iraq because of the changing objectives that were stated by 
the Bush administration. In February 2002, in direct line with the supported fight 
against terrorism, the Bush administration added Iraq to a list of several “evil” 
countries without a broad international consensus on the global hotspots of 
terrorism or on the preventive way to proceed. In June 2002, Bush shifted the 
main objective to the “idealistic” goal of global peace. The justification for a war 
on Iraq was not coherent anymore, and Bush’s peace advocacy and other 
rationales could be perceived as pretended arguments. On 26 August 2002, Vice 
President Cheney addressed the VFW 103rd National Convention and declared 
that a quick reaction in the case of Iraq, without further resolutions by the United 
Nations Security Council would be the best option. “A return of inspectors would 
provide no assurance whatsoever of his [Saddam Hussein’s] compliance with UN  
resolutions. On the contrary, there is great danger that it would provide false 
comfort that Saddam was somehow ‘back in his box.’”199 In the same speech, 
Cheney brought up “regime change” and the danger of “weapons of mass 
destruction” in Iraq as new components of the justification for a war, which 
completed the lack of coherence in the American reasoning. Whether one favors  
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regime change is a matter of political perspective. Regime change in itself, 
however, is against the background of international law, definitely no 
legitimization of a war against a country. 
Gerhard Schröder’s opposition to the probable war against Iraq, which he 
instrumentalized in his favor in the re-election campaign, was not an isolated 
position, but one based on widespread doubts about the credibility of the 
argumentation for a war, since there was no convincing evidence for Cheney’s 
WMD allegations. Schröder’s assessment at that time was shared among 
numerous observers in many countries and, as revealed in May 2005 by the 
Sunday Times, this included even the United Kingdom, the closest ally of the 
United States during the entire controversy on Iraq.200 The new spin in the Bush 
administration’s Iraq policy found opponents not only in Europe and the Middle 
East, but also within the United States, which hardened the pressure on George 
W. Bush. For instance, James Baker III, Secretary of State under George H.W. 
Bush, advised against the plans to pursue a regime change in Baghdad without 
involving the United Nations, although Baker did not oppose regime change 
itself. “So how should we proceed to effect regime change in Iraq? Although the 
United States could certainly succeed, we should try our best not to have to go it 
alone, and the president should reject the advice of those who counsel doing 
so.”201  
The argument that Gerhard Schröder only opposed the upcoming Iraq 
War in order to win re-election cannot stand, since there was widespread 
opposition to Bush’s Iraq policy in the summer of 2002. No evidence could be 
found that would support the view that Schröder was cynical about his anti-Iraq 
War stance and regarded it as mere party politics. However, he definitely 
benefited from his role as the “chancellor of peace.” After an increase in his 
approval rating in August, caused by his crisis management in a severe flood in 
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East Germany, where he underlined his sober decision-making capability under 
pressure, he additionally gained approval by voters due to his anti-Iraq War 
policy. 
In the first week of September 2002, 75 percent of the German population 
was against a unilateral U.S. attack against Iraq and 50 percent rejected the idea 
of a German contribution in a war against Iraq. The other half of the population 
still supported the international coalition and German participation in an operation 
against the threat deriving from Iraq, whereas a vast majority wanted to see the 
UN involved. These views did not significantly change until the election. The strict 
opposition to the Iraq policy of the United States by Gerhard Schröder, however, 
was appreciated by 69 percent of the Germans and represented a considerable 
sign of German assertiveness toward the superpower USA. 
With regard to the perception of the United States (Chapter III.1.b) by the 
German population, and even more by the German chancellor personally, the 
image had shifted dramatically toward the “trigger-happy sheriff” category in 
terms of emphasizing “military power as a tool of foreign policy.” Until late 
September 2002, the discord was still on the factual level, determined by 
different opinions on how to deal with a threat from Iraq. As stated in the joint 
press interview in May 2002 in the garden of the chancellery, the general 
evaluation of Saddam Hussein was the same.  
The analysis of the transatlantic relationship, with special attention to the 
9/11 event and its aftermath, discloses profound changes in the foreign policies 
of Germany and the United States, and their effects on the political and personal 
relationship between George W. Bush and Gerhard Schröder. From the very 
beginning of the Bush administration, U.S. foreign policy showed a unilateral 
stance (e.g., with regard to the Kyoto Protocol) that seemed not to take the 
concerns of other countries into consideration. This attitude changed under the 
impact of the terrorist attacks in September 2001. In order to cope with the 
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threats of international terrorism, the United States, under Bush’s leadership, felt 
obliged to shift its policy toward a multilateral approach.  
Additionally, the 9/11 attacks had a decisive effect on the personal level. 
George W. Bush found the purpose of his presidency in the fight against 
terrorism, and he was willing to commit himself in an extraordinary way. At the 
same time, Gerhard Schröder risked his political career and the governing 
coalition in Germany to support the United States and again to demonstrate the 
reliability of re-unified Germany after the Kosovo War in 1999. The prematurely 
perceived success by the U.S.-dominated military operation in Afghanistan 
accelerated the momentum of Bush’s foreign policy. In this context, apparently 
owing to a perception of American supremacy, Iraq became a near-term 
objective in “the war on terror.”  
Due to the lack of evidence of a relationship between terrorism and Iraq, 
the Bush administration changed its justification for  a war against the dictator 
Saddam Hussein several times. In summer 2002, Gerhard Schröder publicly 
opposed the American policy the first time. The Bush administration had 
previously stated that it would act alone, if necessary. According to the German 
chancellor, it was not only the policy itself that provoked his opposition, but also 
the presumption of Bush’s claim to the absolute truth. The positive result for 
Schröder’s re-election campaign is apparent; however, the open opposition had 
effects on the rhetoric rather than on the decision against the war itself. George 
W. Bush found his purpose in trying to transform the world while fighting 
terrorism and other global threats. Gerhard Schröder found the purpose of his 
second term in opposition to the war in Iraq in order to protect the world from 
“adventures.” Schröder put the reputation of Germany’s foreign policy at stake 
when he stated that Germany would not participate in a war against the Saddam 
Hussein regime in Iraq even if such a war were approved in a resolution of the 
United Nations Security Council. 
 92 
C.  THE ESCALATION OF DISCORD 
On 19 September 2002, the discord was still on the factual level, but this 
changed the following day, when the German Minister of Justice, Herta Däubler-
Gmelin, made an unclear comparison of the policies of George W. Bush and 
Adolf Hitler.  Gerhard Schröder, who knew that the bilateral relationship had 
already been tested, immediately sent a personal apology to the U.S. president, 
stating, "I want to let you know how much I regret the fact that alleged comments 
by the German justice minister have given an impression that has offended 
you."202 The apology, however, was not accepted by the White House, since 
Bush expected an instant dismissal of the German Justice Minister; and 
Condoleezza Rice as well as Donald Rumsfeld accused Germany of having 
“poisoned” the relationship at that time.203  
Bush’s reaction to the Däubler-Gmelin incident revealed the 
personalization of the escalating discord between the two leaders and certain 
underlying issues of character as concerns the chief personality involved, as well 
as his ideal of statecraft. “The president was so angry that he told his staff that he 
wanted to read every statement on Germany coming out of the White House. He 
left the impression that he had decided to personally oversee the U.S. 
reaction.”204 After Schröder’s victory in the 2002 election, Bush refused to 
congratulate his German counterpart,205 and in the following months, the rhetoric 
against Germany intensified with the egging on of various groups with an anti-
German and anti-EU agenda. Donald Rumsfeld’s verbal division of Europe into a 
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new and an old part and his snubbing of Germany’s Defense Minister at the 
meeting of NATO defense ministers in Poland in September 2002 were only two 
examples among others.206 The reason for Bush’s harsh over-reaction is not 
absolutely clear, but it could be explained by his perception of being betrayed by 
Schröder, who had promised not to instrumentalize Iraq in his re-election 
campaign. Furthermore, it can be assumed that the opposition of a previously 
close ally, Germany, implied the risk that even more countries would step out of 
line in the campaign against international terrorism. 
The Bush administration was not alone in excessively personalized and 
undiplomatic responses. Schröder’s government added fuel to the flames. For 
example, Ludwig Stiegler, Chairman of the SPD faction, in September 2002,  
publicly compared the American president with the Roman Emperor Caesar 
Augustus and U.S. Ambassador Daniel Coats (whose behavior aroused scorn 
from critics of the Bush administration) with the former Soviet ambassador in the 
German Democratic Republic, during the height of the Cold War, Pjotr 
Abrassimov.207  
On 17 September 2002, the Bush administration released a new National 
Security Strategy (NSS) that endorsed the preemptive use of force for the first 
time, in an official document, after occasional hints in speeches of White House 
officials such as Vice President Dick Cheney on 26 August 2002 (see chapter 
V.2.1).208 Numerous critics evaluated the actual nature of the preemptive use of 
force prescribed in the NSS 2002 as an announcement of an intention to conduct 
preventive wars. For instance, Robert Pape concluded that, “the strategy against 
rogue states fits with the more aggressive policy of preventive war, a fact 
recognized in the Bush administration’s own national security strategy 
                                            
206 James Geary, “Collision Course,” Time Magazine, September 29, 2002, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,356044,00.html?iid=chix-sphere (accessed 
May 15, 2008). 
207 Der Spiegel, “SPD-Breitseite gegen Bush erzürnt die Union,” September 7, 2002, 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,212989,00.html (accessed April 23, 2008). 
208 The White House, “National Security Strategy,” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html (accessed April 23, 2008). 
 94 
statements.”209 Against the background of the increasing likelihood of a war in 
Iraq in the fall of 2002, the new strategy was regarded as a further sign of 
momentum in that direction.  
In October 2002, the Congress authorized the president with an 
overwhelming majority to use the U.S. military “as he determines to be necessary 
and appropriate” to defend U.S. national security “against the continuing threat 
posed by Iraq.”210 In November 2002, expectations of an early strike against Iraq 
were muted when Bush followed Colin Powell’s advice to focus on diplomacy in 
the UN. The efforts in the UN demonstrated the U.S. attempt to pursue a 
multinational approach or at least to obtain UN Security Council approval for the 
use of force by a coalition. George W. Bush’s decision was strictly against the 
recommendation of Cheney and Rumsfeld, who favored a firmly unilateral policy 
and who previously had an essential influence on the president’s shift in foreign 
policy in 2002. During the process of drafting a speech for a new UNSC 
resolution on Iraq, “Cheney and Rumsfeld continued to press. Asking for a new 
resolution would snag them in a morass of U.N. debate and hesitation, opening 
the door for Saddam to negotiate.”211 On 8 November 2002, the UN Security 
Council unanimously approved Resolution 1441 and recalled “that the Council 
has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of 
its continued violations of its obligations.”212 The resolution did not explicitly 
authorize the use of force in the event that Iraq failed to disarm its WMD facilities 
or to cooperate with the weapons inspections of the UN. In other words, it was 
left open whether a second resolution would be required to authorize the use of 
force to compel Saddam Hussein to cooperate. 
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At the same time, Gerhard Schröder pursued a double strategy. On one 
hand, he was interested in revitalizing the traumatized German-U.S. bi-lateral 
relationship by assuming more military responsibility in Afghanistan. He also 
guaranteed support for an Iraq intervention within the context of NATO 
obligations in terms of German permission for the United States and its coalition 
partners to use airbases in Germany, German participation in airborne AWACS, 
and a loan of German Patriot anti-missile systems. On the other hand, his strict 
stance against a war in Iraq had not changed and he was intent on an 
uncompromising position on any American attempt to wage a war in Iraq.  
1.  Schröder’s Shift Back to Anti-War Rhetoric 
Schröder underlined his personal commitment on this issue by stating, 
“Deep inside I was strongly inclined to resign rather than compromise on this 
issue. Moving away from opposition to the Iraq war did not come into 
question.”213 However, until 25 January 2003 he avoided making public 
statements against the Bush administration’s Iraq policy and made several 
attempts to improve the bilateral relationship. During an election campaign in his 
home state of Lower Saxony, notably in Goslar, he supported the state SPD that 
suffered from a nationwide decline of approval and he returned to his anti-war 
rhetoric and played the Iraq card again. He addressed the following message to 
the United States, "Don't count on Germany voting in favour of a resolution that 
would legitimise a war. Never again will there be a Germany of aggression."214 
Schröder used the stage of the election campaign to counter his foreign 
minister’s previous attempts to weaken the strict stance of the German 
government that had refused to support the use of force even under a UNSCR in 
the fall of 2002; this position was against the German government’s political 
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guideline of multilateralism and institutionalism. In February 2003, Der Spiegel 
reported severe intra-governmental tensions between the chancellor and the 
foreign minister because Fischer was afraid of political isolation while Schröder 
pursued his personal policy and did not consult his foreign minister prior to his 
Goslar statements. This was a pattern typical of Schröder’s personality; he had 
often created facts via the media.215  
Once again, one might argue that Schröder acted purely according to 
election tactics. Gregor Schöllgen argues that such tactics played a role, but not 
the decisive role. The crucial reason for Schröder’s political course was his 
previous experiences in the context of the Afghanistan mission in 2001, not the 
upcoming state elections.216 Additionally, it can be assumed that Schröder 
actually wanted to use all means to avoid a war based on his personal 
conviction, since he always had the option of simply not contributing to the war 
instead of actively opposing it. In the judgment of Elizabeth Pond, “the 
chancellor’s defiance of the United States this time was a deliberate policy choice 
to magnify rather than minimize differences.”217 In Schröder’s view, arguments 
against a war in Iraq were eventually vindicated by the results of the U.S.-led 
intervention. Schröder had warned that the territorial integrity of Iraq was at stake  
as well as regional stability in the Middle East. There was also the risk of a 
weakening of the broad coalition in the fight against international terrorism, the 
likelihood of a social and political situation in Iraq that would make the 
establishment of democracy and a liberal economic system difficult, and the 
possibility of a cultural clash of civilizations in the Middle East.218 The fact that 
Bush rejected all attempts to normalize the “poisoned” relationship in the period 
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from October 2002 to January 2003 certainly influenced Schröder, too. As David 
M. Andrews observed, “the White House’s deep and continuing censure of 
Gerhard Schröder … helped drive the somewhat reluctant German leader into 
the arms of Jacques Chirac – two men who had never previously been 
particularly cordial.”219  
2.  European Opposition to the Bush Administration  
In the final phase of the prelude to the war against the Saddam Hussein 
regime in Iraq, Germany held a seat on the UN Security Council as a 
nonpermanent member without a veto. In order to prevent a second legitimizing 
resolution for an attack on Iraq, Chancellor Schröder started to build a coalition 
with France and Russia, both permanent members of the Security Council and 
each with a veto. In effect, Gerhard Schröder tried to shift his personal conflict 
with George W. Bush to the United Nations Security Council.  
In the French president, Jacques Chirac, Schröder found a like-minded 
leader who had already expressed disapproval of a unilateralist approach during 
the UNSCR 1441 discussions in the Security Council in November 2002, 
although he had not opposed that resolution publicly. After consultations with 
Schröder on the fortieth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty on 20 January 2003, (a 
treaty between France and Germany arranged by de Gaulle as an alternative to 
the close postwar German-American relationship in 1963) Chirac decided to 
pursue a policy in the Security Council that was focused on UN inspections in 
accordance with UNSCR 1441, rather than on military might. The French 
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minister, Dominique de Villepin, declared that it would be ''a victory for the law of 
the strongest,'' if Washington attacked Iraq without the explicit authorization of 
the UNSC.220  
Schröder’s attempt to align the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, with a 
position opposed to that of the United States in the Security Council was not as 
successful as the previous one with France. Although Putin favored the 
disarmament of the Iraqis and publicly opposed a military intervention, he 
avoided any indication that Russia would impose a veto. Presumably, Putin 
wanted to retain his close relationship with the United States. Four months 
earlier, Josef Joffe, an astute German expert, claimed, “Russia has (almost) 
become America's best partner-in-arms.”221  
The different nuances of the three European countries’ positions on the 
Iraq question apparently led to Condoleezza Rice’s harsh statement in the spring 
of 2003, “Punish France, ignore Germany, forgive Russia,"222 which seemed to 
describe accurately how Bush dealt with these European powers. Bush’s 
reaction was not only of a rhetorical nature, he directed his administration to 
pursue diplomatic support. George W. Bush’s team succeeded in creating a 
European coalition, in contrast with Paris, Berlin and Moscow that strongly 
supported the U.S. administration’s hard line. One of the results was a joint 
declaration by eight leaders of European governments in the Wall Street Journal 
on 30 January 2003, which demonstrated the European division on this issue.223  
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A further demonstration of division within Europe came on 6 February 2003, 
when ten additional European countries expressed support for the U.S. position 
on Iraq.224 
After bilateral German-U.S. tensions starting in 2002, and dissents in the 
UNSC and within Europe on the Iraq issue at the beginning of 2003, the dispute 
spilled over into the last “sacrosanct” institution that had served the entire 
transatlantic region to overcome the post-World War II Soviet threat and which 
remained a framework of security for all of its members: NATO. In February 
2003, the United States tried to invoke the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 4 on 
behalf of Turkey in the case of a probable Iraqi threat during the upcoming war. 
Schröder, in company with France and Belgium, refused this request, since it 
would demonstrate that within NATO a diplomatic solution of the Iraq conflict had 
already been dismissed and that NATO as an institution was involved in war 
preparations.225 In fact, although Turkey later directly requested support under 
Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, it seemed to the German government and 
others to be an active approach by the Bush administration to increase pressure 
on the “coalition of the un-willing” within NATO. “As a German official put it, ‘We 
promised to supply the Patriots to Turkey bilaterally and asked the United States 
please not to force us to be an obstruction within NATO. But the Bush 
administration was determined to make life difficult for Schröder by having 
Germany vote yes to the deployment, thus undermining the chancellor’s own 
position against the Iraq war.’”226 
Despite attempts by the United States to convince the UN Security 
Council with evidence of the existence of WMD in Iraq, the expected stalemate in 
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the Security Council, due to a French veto and further opposition, led Tony Blair, 
the British Prime Minister, who had previously insisted on a second UNSC 
resolution for domestic support, to agree with President Bush on the need to 
attack Iraq in any case.227 After the approval of military action in the House of 
Commons on 18 March 2003, on 20 March 2003 joint U.S.-British air strikes 
began in Iraq without a second legitimizing resolution of the UN Security Council.  
Schröder’s attempts to prevent a war in Iraq had failed and he still found 
Germany more or less diplomatically isolated. Just before the attacks started, 
Chancellor Schröder expressed once more his personal stance on a war in Iraq: 
"Does the scale of the threat from the Iraqi dictator justify the launch of a war that 
will certainly bring death to thousands of innocent men, women and children? My 
answer in this case has been and remains: No."228 
D.  DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE IN THE TRANSATLANTIC AREA 
1.  An American Perspective 
In order to analyze the personal influence of George W. Bush on the 
dispute between Germany and the United States on the Iraq issue, it is 
necessary to set his attitudes, decisions and statements in a broader context. 
This section investigates the extent to which the “Bush Doctrine” was in line with 
the views of the main political parties and public opinion in the United States.  
Since Congress in October 2002 authorized the president to use the U.S. 
armed forces to defend U.S. national security “against the continuing threat 
posed by Iraq,” it can be assumed that there was broad approval for President 
Bush’s policy in the political elite. Otherwise, the mechanism of checks and 
balances would have failed after the terrorist attacks in September 2001. The 
domestic opposition, or at least a controversial public debate, was reduced to a 
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relatively small number of commentators, political leaders, and scholars, and 
their overall impact was marginal in 2002 and 2003. In contrast, a substantial, 
open discussion was held in Europe; but it did not have any significant influence 
on the American debate and policy.  
Michael Desch argues that the reason for the overwhelming support for 
President Bush’s policy in the prelude to the Iraq war was the deep-rooted U.S. 
liberalism that basically approved an active American foreign policy and explicitly 
favored a strategy that spreads democracy.229 Lawrence Kaplan wrote in 2003 
that, “Bush is becoming the most Wilsonian president since Wilson himself.”230 
Both major political parties, the Democrats and the Republicans, shared the 
basic liberal stance in the general sense and hence public arguments against the 
democratization rationale were rare until the costs of the Iraq war mounted. The 
examples of U.S. presidents and their foreign policies discussed in Chapter IV 
showed that in the past, whatever the administration’s party affiliation, most 
presidents have favored a rather active U.S. role in global security policies. 
Against the background of a common liberal stance in the United States, it 
is not surprising that in the course of 2002, the justification for an invasion of Iraq 
shifted from the war against terrorism to the search for WMD and finally the ideal 
of democratization of the Middle East. With regard to the variety of the Bush 
administration’s justifications for the war, Andrew Denison concluded that one 
reason would not have been enough to convince the American public and other 
countries, in contrast with the first Iraq war in 1990-1991.231 A poll in the United 
States showed that the following three arguments were assessed to be the most 
convincing “good reasons” to attack Iraq in March 2003: prevention of the spread 
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of WMD (85 percent), liberation of the Iraqi people (84 percent), and maintaining 
the leading role of the United States and its values (77 percent).232  
In general, acceptance of the use of force in order to obtain justice can be 
assessed as high in the United States. In 2003, 84 percent of Americans agreed 
with the necessity of the use of military power under certain conditions.233 Ronald 
Asmus et al. concluded that, “an American President – irrespective of his political 
persuasion – has considerable leeway in terms of building public support when it 
comes to the use of force.”234 Apparently, the chosen strategy of George W. 
Bush did not face significant domestic opposition. 
However, on one particular issue the majority of Americans deviated from 
the Bush administration’s political line, because the majority favored a 
multinational approach. As late as January 2003, 56 percent agreed that the 
United States “should not invade unless a new UN vote authorizes action.”235 In 
other words, in addition to British pressure and Colin Powell’s advice to get a 
Security Council mandate prior to attacking Iraq, public demand also encouraged 
Bush to go the UN way. These reasons may have prompted the American 
president not to follow his unilaterally oriented advisors, Cheney, Rumsfeld and 
Wolfowitz, as he did before, when he shaped his security strategy.  
When the U.S.-German relationship on the governmental level turned into 
a “poisoned” one and subsequently George W. Bush decided to ignore 
Schröder’s objections to his Iraq policy, one might ask whether the American 
people also changed their attitude toward Germany. In the period from June 
2002 to June 2003 positive feelings toward Germany decreased, but they were 
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still positive (from 63 down to 56; a value higher than 50 means favorable).236 
According to the same poll, the rate of decline, however, was exactly the same 
as the European average (64 down to 57), Italy (68 down to 61) and Great Britain 
(68 down to 61). In this context, it is noteworthy that the two latter countries were 
among President Bush’s strongest supporters in West Europe during the crisis 
over the Iraq war. Hence, one might conclude that Europe as a whole lost the 
American public’s favor and the neglect of Schröder’s Germany by the Bush 
administration was more of a reaction on the personal level.  
George W. Bush had retained a high public approval rate since 9/11. His 
security policy change in 2002 also got broad support, because its elements 
regarding the use of force and the willingness of the United States to actively 
shape the international security environment found broad domestic approval as 
well. This, nonetheless, did not apply to the policy chosen on how to attain these 
political goals. As noted earlier, the majority of Americans favored a multinational 
coalition, unlike Bush, who regarded it as desirable but not necessary, and a 
multinational authorization for the use of force in the UNSC.  
With regard to international relations, though the American people became 
a little more skeptical toward all European countries during the Iraq crisis, the 
majority did not express their perception in stereotype patterns, as their president 
did, but maintained their rather benevolent stance toward foreign countries. The 
latter applies especially to Germany, which the Bush administration “ignored,” 
and to a lesser extent to France, which was to be “punished” for the announced 
veto in early 2003. George W. Bush’s personal involvement in foreign policy 
seemed to have led him to react to Schröder’s opposition in a way that was not 
backed by the majority of the American people and that was not sound from a 
diplomatic viewpoint. 
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2.  A German Perspective 
As outlined above, in the period from 11 September 2001 until early 
summer 2002, George W. Bush was able to unite a nearly global coalition in the 
“war on terror” or – the common term in Europe – the “fight against terrorism.” 
The formerly overwhelming international support, however, eroded in the course 
of 2002. This development was caused mainly by the shift of American foreign 
policy toward a perceived aggressive approach that changed from a combined, 
multinational coalition against international terrorism to ad hoc coalitions of the 
willing under American predominance, and focused on objectives that were no 
longer solely related to the threat of terrorism.  
Since summer 2002, Germany, under Chancellor Schröder had been one 
of the harshest opponents of the Bush administration’s policy. In his re-election 
campaign, the incumbent chancellor first expressed criticism in a factual way and 
later shifted to categorical opposition. Schröder’s chosen course lifted his 
approval rate and contributed at least partially to his re-election. According to 
polls, his stance on the Iraq issue was in line with that of the German people and 
their general rejection of the use of force. In 2003, only 12 percent of the German 
public agreed with the proposition that under certain conditions, war is necessary 
to obtain justice, which was contrary to the view of 55 percent of the public in the 
United States.237 In the specific case of Iraq, 85 percent of the Germans opposed 
the use of military force.238  
Yet, the reasons for the different stances on the use of force might derive 
from different cultural or historical values in the two countries, since the 
seemingly most obvious reason, differing threat assessments, did not apply. In 
the new security environment as of 2003, Americans (70 percent) and Germans 
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(74 percent) saw in international terrorism the most important threat and, with 
regard to other possible perils, the public assessments in the two countries were 
not far from each other.239 However, the similar threat assessments led to neither 
the same analytical conclusions nor to the same policy prescriptions. The vast 
majority of Germans (84 percent) strongly favored the imposition of economic 
sanctions instead of the use of military force (11 percent) in order to counter 
threats.240  
German citizens indeed perceived a high level of threat from terrorism, but 
they did not believe that they were at war as the Americans did. Two New York 
Times reporters analyzed the above differences just before Bush traveled to 
Europe in the summer of 2002 and concluded: “The Europeans clearly do not 
believe that they are at war. They are worried that Mr. Bush may drag them into a 
new war in Iraq, destabilize the Middle East and put enormous strain on 
NATO.”241  
That the Germans disagreed specifically with President Bush’s foreign 
policy rather than holding a general negative attitude toward Americans was 
confirmed by opinion polls. Already in 2002, 62 percent of the German public 
disapproved of the way George W. Bush handled foreign affairs (this increased 
to 81 percent in 2003), whereas the decline in German support for the United 
States in general was much smaller.242 These numbers suggest that subliminal 
anti-Americanism, deliberately triggered by Chancellor Schröder, might have 
been a catalyst for the discord, but that the shift in Bush’s foreign policy was the 
real issue from a German perspective and that the legacy of doubt about the 
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utility of war had been deeply rooted in the German people since 1945. This 
inference is backed by Robert A. Pape, who concluded that “the main concern of 
other states is not with the goals of U.S. policy, but with the means, especially 
with the Bush administration’s willingness to use unilateral military action to 
achieve otherwise acceptable goals.”243 
Despite the predominant rejection of the use of armed force in Germany, 
there was some broad opposition to Schröder’s one-sided approach in the 
prelude to the Iraq war. During the national election campaigns in the fall of 2002, 
the candidate of the conservative CDU/CSU party, Edmund Stoiber, then 
Bavarian State Governor, and Guido Westerwelle, the chairman of the FDP 
liberal party, stressed the importance of a strong transatlantic relationship, the 
significance of the UN Security Council and the value of coordination and 
consensus within the European Union – all of which they saw as jeopardized by 
Gerhard Schröder’s anti-Bush campaign.244 Besides the ongoing political party 
opposition to Schröder, there was also harsh criticism in the “hawkish media” in 
Germany, as Schröder put it.245 For instance, among other periodicals, the 
German newspaper Die Zeit questioned Schröder’s ability in statecraft in view of 
his absolute rejection of the Iraq war, even in the case of a UNSC mandate. 
Josef Joffe of Stanford University and Die Zeit argued that Schröder’s position 
undermined international institutions and Germany’s bargaining power in 
Washington.246 In this context, the anti-war attitude itself was not the object of 
criticism, but rather the way in which Schröder articulated German policy. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The cultural and structural split in the transatlantic relationship between 
the United States and Germany had already begun in the years since 1989 – that 
is before George W. Bush and Gerhard Schröder took office. The historical 
examples of relationships between American presidents and German 
chancellors, reviewed in Chapter IV, showed that disputes between the two 
countries had important precedents to that of 2002. Since the late 1940s, there 
had been controversies, including different general approaches to foreign affairs 
and discussions about the role of Germany within the NATO alliance in terms of 
burden- and responsibility-sharing. Since the 1970s, a new West German 
assertiveness, based mainly on increasing economic power, had emerged. The 
Federal Republic of Germany demanded a more prominent position within the 
transatlantic framework in terms of consultations and political influence.  
In this context, the personal relationship between the heads of 
government in the two countries played a significant role and partially mirrored 
the extent of U.S. acceptance of a more prominent role for Germany. For 
instance, the personal controversies between Jimmy Carter and Helmut Schmidt 
were influenced by an American failure to recognize the importance of Germany, 
and in the case of George H.W. Bush and Helmut Kohl, the amicable relationship 
led to a special bond between the two countries. Whatever the level of amity or 
animosity, the bi-lateral relationships had one decisive attribute in common: even 
the most contrarian political or personal positions had never erupted in tensions 
that would have challenged the transatlantic bond itself. Statecraft, diplomacy 
and the ability to weigh the importance of the alliance prevented the protagonists 
from prioritizing short-term benefits over long-term common goals.  
One has to acknowledge that until 1989, the common external threat of 
the Cold War had certainly served as a centripetal force. The bi-lateral relations 
in the aftermath of the Cold War, however, proved that even without this uniting 
factor, statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic were able to retain this special 
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relationship. The two countries accepted their specific leadership roles: the 
United States as the only superpower and Germany as an integrating catalyst of 
a united and peaceful Europe. Although cultural differences – especially about 
the use of military force and governmental spending for security – persisted, the 
necessity for adjustments regarding these issues was accepted by Europe in 
general, and Germany in particular, after the Balkan crises of the 1990s. 
Though until 11 September 2001, the tense political environment had not 
changed significantly, one could observe that after the inauguration of George W. 
Bush in January 2001 the bilateral relationship had gradually changed. It later 
reached unprecedented heights of personal animosity over the Iraq crisis. An 
immoderate level of personalization of foreign policy as well as a temporary lack 
of diplomacy and statecraft may explain this development on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Instead of seeking reconciliation and compromise, as their predecessors 
had, both statesmen, the German chancellor and the American president, served 
as significant drivers of the growing division between the United States and 
Germany.  
The discord over the Iraq crisis revealed not only the different 
personalities of the two protagonists and the different behavior patterns evident 
in their previous careers, but also similarities in their characters, which 
paradoxically, widened the transatlantic gap. 
A.  DIFFERENCES IN DECISION MAKING 
When Gerhard Schröder took office in 1998, he was at the height of a 
long, bright political career that started in the far left of the political spectrum in 
the 1960s and gradually shifted to the center of the spectrum. A high level of 
pragmatism, some might say opportunism, determined his vocational 
development. In order to gain political power and prestige, two of his decisive 
goals, he often focused his politics on public approval and frequently 
demonstrated his make-or-break attitude. In this context, he was not afraid to 
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make use of the media in his favor and even created facts without previous party 
consultations, which caused tremendous irritation in the SPD establishment.  
However, the keys to Schröder’s political success that eventually brought 
him into the chancellery were his high level of popularity and his determination to 
follow his personal instincts uncompromisingly and not to rely on partisans. 
Against the background of his previous political career and decision-making 
process, it is not surprising that he decided on one hand to declare unconditional 
solidarity with the United States almost instantly, and without conclusive 
consultations after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, and, on the other 
hand, in view of the upcoming Iraq war in the final phase of the re-election 
campaign in 2002, yet again without consulting his advisors or his coalition 
partner, he decided to oppose the war with an absolute rejectionist campaign. 
Since the latter implied a rejection of the use of force even under the auspices of 
a UNSCR, his decision broke with the legacy of German foreign policy 
determined by multi-lateralism and institutionalism and furthermore caused 
tremendous tensions with his Minister of Foreign Affairs. With regard to the 
United States, Schröder’s approach to bi-lateral relations was ambiguous. On  
one hand, he was well aware of the importance of the transatlantic partner in 
terms of economic interdependence and America’s crucial role as a security 
provider. On the other hand, he was critical of the dominance of the United 
States and of conservative governments in Washington in general. 
In contrast with Schröder, George W. Bush’s political career began only in 
his mid-forties and was mostly based on elite social networks, support from his 
politically influential family, and his personal ability to inspire others with his 
“straightforward” Texas manner and strategic, conservative ideas suited to a 
large portion of the U.S. electorate at the turn of the century. Due to his limited 
political experience, he relied, as Governor of Texas and as President of the 
United States, to an exceptional extent, on the advice of his carefully recruited 
staff of experts. His overarching political objectives were the re-establishment of  
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conservative values and a strong international position for the United States with 
a central role for military power. He believed in the moral imperative of faith-
based behavior and keeping one’s word.  
George W. Bush’s decision-making process was mostly determined by his 
style of leadership. He saw his position in the government as the leader of a 
team with strategic ideas and as the final decider without the need for more 
comprehensive insights. Hence, his final decisions normally resulted directly from 
the proposals of his more or less autonomous staff. As a consequence, 
depending on the issue and the commitment of the respective advisor, Bush’s 
decisions reflected the advisor’s recommendations to a large extent. This was of 
particular importance in the Bush administration, since at least two different 
political camps significantly influenced U.S. foreign policy. On one hand, the 
rather moderate and multi-laterally oriented State Department under Colin 
Powell, as well as National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, affected the 
decision-making process of George W. Bush. On the other hand, the neo-
conservative and unilaterally oriented Defense Department under Donald 
Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, as well as Vice President Dick Cheney, brought 
their influence to bear. Bush’s decisions about U.S. security policy featured 
elements from both camps. However, the neo-conservatives seemed to 
overbalance the moderates after 11 September 2001. Furthermore, members of 
the latter camp instrumentalized their freedom of action within the administration 
more than others and actively promoted their ideas. For instance, Rumsfeld had  
already brought up the Iraq issue after the president’s inauguration in January 
2001 and suggested attacking Iraq after 11 September 2001. 
With regard to the decision-making process of the two leaders, one could 
conclude that short-term publicity effects significantly influenced the German 
chancellor. Depending on the current situation, the American president’s 
decisions were mostly based on the advice of different political camps in his 
administration, although the neo-conservatives were pre-dominant. George W. 
Bush and his administration had a rather neutral perspective on Germany and its 
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chancellor. Bush was well aware of the unchallenged might and superiority of the 
United States and therefore Germany did not play a significant role in his 
approach to foreign affairs. 
The completely different life experiences, styles of decision-making and 
political cultures of the two leaders help explain their substantially contrasting 
political approaches in foreign affairs. Since their predecessors were able to 
overcome severe arguments even after the end of the Cold War, one should also 
address the similarities of Bush and Schröder that eventually drove them further 
apart. 
B.  SIMILARITIES OF THE TWO LEADERS 
Gerhard Schröder and George W. Bush were both domestic policy-
minded when they took office, and this was reflected in their initial election 
campaigns while seeking national office. However, the nature of Germany’s 
closely institutionalized European ties, and the crisis in Kosovo, soon obliged the 
German chancellor to shift his attention to foreign affairs. Even George W. Bush, 
who explicitly tried to reduce the international commitments of the United States, 
was forced to place foreign policy at the top of his political agenda after 11 
September 2001. The lack of experience in foreign affairs, which applied even 
more to the American president, implied that at the beginning of the respective 
terms of the heads of government, miscalculations and mistaken decisions on 
the international stage could not be excluded. The prudent way in which 
Schröder managed the Kosovo crisis and in which Bush handled the immediate 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks was, therefore, surprising. However, the 
subsequent pursuit of a common strategy on both sides of the Atlantic caused 
huge problems, which derived from both inexperience and differing cultural 
backgrounds.   
 Additionally, with Gerhard Schröder and George W. Bush, two leaders of 
government took office, one in Germany and one in the United States, neither of 
whom had any direct experience of World War II. The aftermath of this war 
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brought the two countries closer together than ever before and resulted in a 
sustainable security architecture that would contain the Soviet threat and 
promote prosperity in the entire transatlantic region. Apparently, Bush and 
Schröder both assessed these close ties as less important than their 
predecessors had regarded them, although Schröder never left any doubt about 
the importance of NATO as the guarantor of Germany’s security. Despite his 
dispute with Bush over the Iraq war, he regularly stressed Germany’s reliability 
within the NATO framework and even risked his political career in 1998-1999 (the 
Kosovo crisis) and 2001 (Germany’s contribution to the operations in 
Afghanistan) in order to ensure the stability of this decisive treaty organization. 
The most obvious similarities were the unprecedented style of rhetoric and 
the personalization of foreign affairs on both sides of the Atlantic. In the summer 
of 2002, each leader felt betrayed by his counterpart. On one hand, Schröder 
sensed that Bush did not intend to consult his German counterpart on the 
decision to wage a war against Iraq or on the strategy to fight international 
terrorism. On the other hand, Bush perceived dishonesty and decided to control 
further bi-lateral communication personally, when Schröder started to 
instrumentalize the Iraq war in his re-election campaign. The mix of different 
political stances and the high level of personal involvement elevated tensions. 
The situation of mutual skepticism and misperceptions escalated into an 
emotionally driven dispute. In this context, one might ask about the role of the 
advisors and diplomats who could have taken the emotional component out of 
the discord. On the American side, the hawkish camp, especially Rumsfeld and 
Wolfowitz, added fuel to the flames by the use of inappropriate rhetoric, and the 
U.S. president made no visible attempts to restrain them. On the German side, 
government officials and the Justice Minister, in particular, placed additional 
stress on the relationship. After the German national elections in September 
2002, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer, and the Chancellor, 
Gerhard Schröder, tried to normalize the strained situation, but failed due to the 
uncompromising attitude of the Bush administration. When Schröder realized that 
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he had lost any hope for bargaining with his American counterpart, he thwarted 
all further attempts at reconciliation and started to organize a counter-coalition. 
The lack of sound statecraft on both sides of the Atlantic meant that the rising 
conflict eventually escalated in late 2002 and early 2003.  
 The two leaders of government, both uncompromisingly claimed moral 
superiority in this dispute, and this served as another emotional catalyst for the 
escalation. From George W. Bush’s perspective, the new National Security 
Strategy of 2002 was a logical prescription in light of the changed global security 
environment after 11 September 2001. The fact that he gained both domestic 
and international approval immediately after the terrorist attacks until mid-2002 
strengthened the position of the neo-conservatives within the Bush administration 
and seemed to confirm that he had chosen the only correct and commonly 
shared way to handle the crucial situation. To pursue the policy he had chosen, 
without wavering, and to believe in its success, reflected his personality. 
From Schröder’s perspective, the United States had abandoned the 
previous consensus of a global coalition against the threat of international 
terrorism. Bush seemed to ignore international law in order to follow a unilateral 
Pax Americana agenda that could initiate additional international conflicts rather 
than solve them. The shift in Bush’s strategy, made without consultations with 
formerly close allies, might have confirmed Schröder’s subliminal anti-American 
prejudices, and the perception of moral as well as political superiority prevailed. 
As a consequence, Schröder felt obliged to use any means available to prevent 
the upcoming war and disregarded the diplomatic consequences. In late 2002 
and early 2003, the Bush administration tried to marginalize the most populous 
country in the European Union, a country that is still one of the decisive motors of 
the old continent in terms of economic outcomes, and which remains one of the 
most important architects of the extension of Euro-Atlantic institutions to the East 
since 1990. Bush’s motives seemed to be public short-term satisfaction rather 
than prudent guidance in the role of a superpower. The undiplomatic U.S. 
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marginalization of Germany’s role by the end of 2002 undoubtedly spurred 
Schröder’s personal commitment to oppose the Iraq war. 
The discord over Iraq could be seen as the final phase of a re-organization 
of “the West” after the demise of communism. Germany and the United States 
had to define their new political positions as well as the future. The two heads of 
government certainly embodied the extreme positions at that time. George W. 
Bush, influenced by perceived national vulnerability after 11 September 2001, 
expected a continuation of the unchallenged superior position of the United 
States and the alignment of long-standing allies. The initial broad support in 
Operation Enduring Freedom in late 2001 did not lead him to expect massive 
opposition to his chosen course. Gerhard Schröder, on the other hand, saw 
Germany as a mature, independent country, and this was the continuation of a 
process that had already begun in the 1970s.  
The global security environment, after the demise of the Soviet threat in 
1989-1991, had definitely changed, and this made the formerly close 
transatlantic ties less important at first glance. With regard to the discord over 
Iraq, David M. Andrews put it in the following way: “Washington and Berlin are at 
liberty to pursue far more foolish policies in the early twenty-first century than … 
during most of the late twentieth century.”247 However, the transatlantic 
relationship is still the manifestation of the shared ideals of “the West,” including 
its basic values of freedom, security and democracy. Judgments on the way to 
handle upcoming challenges and external threats, as well as how to pursue 
shared goals, continue to diverge due to cultural and structural differences. 
Hence, it should be the primary obligation of statecraft in Germany and the 
United States to re-align the relationship and transatlantic policies. The 
personalization of foreign policies and the articulation of claims to possess the 
absolute truth, as occurred in the discord over the Iraq crisis, are undoubtedly 
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poor guidelines for the future. Two great nations, whose former enmity has made 
the transition to a worthy alliance, cannot allow the security and peace of the 
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